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ABSTRACT
European imperialism in the Americas was predicated on violent regimes of indigenous
genocide, transatlantic enslavement, and environmental exploitation. Conquest of pre-contact
indigenous societies in the New World intended to secure possession of valuable reserves of
natural resources, like the gold and silver mines of colonial Mexico and Peru. European empires
commissioned maps of these territories to generate and shape knowledge. Maps are the product
of specific social and political frameworks and are informed by the priorities and preoccupations
of empires. What they represent or omit reveals much about the colonial regimes that were
imposed on the landscapes of the Americas. Maps present an image of imperial dominion that
was totalizing even in places beyond the bounds of the colony. Blank spaces featured on colonial
maps were not merely unconquered or unincorporated space, but rather spaces where the colony
– and thereby the empire – failed to project or maintain authority. This dissertation demonstrates
that these landscapes were never blank, they were instead home to indigeneity and resistance.
In the mountainous interior and on the northside of Jamaica, the indigenous persisted and
resisted imperialism long after European conquest. Intricate networks of communication,
subsistence, and collaboration connected these spaces and formed geographies of resistance that
were the foundations of Jamaican Marronage. Maroon ecological practices and social traditions
embedded in these geographies evolved over time in response to both an influx of African
runaways and colonial aggression. In the early eighteenth century, colonial settlement invaded
the blank spaces featured on maps of Jamaica. By this time, the Maroons had occupied and
cultivated these lands for well over half a century in defiance of the colonial government and its
forces. Their existence and persistence reveal how colonial maps inadvertently outlined
geographies of resistance where indigeneity and Marronage found refuge, where Maroon

identities coalesced, and where Maroons waged their war against the onslaught of European
imperialism.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 10, 2021, troops from the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) invaded the
land owned by Accompong Maroon farmers in St. Elizabeth Parish. After entering, the JCF
troops destroyed the farmers’ marijuana crops until they were chased away by local Maroons
armed only with drums and camera phones. The tense stand-off came to a non-violent conclusion
once the recently elected leader of the Accompong Marooons Chief Richard Currie confronted
the interlopers and demanded they lower their weapons and vacate Maroon territory. Two days
later, Jamaican Minister of National Security Horace Chang distanced the JCF from the actions
of the six “rogue” agents who instigated the incident. He seized the opportunity, however, to
simultaneously question and undermine Maroon sovereignty by claiming that, to his knowledge,
“there is no such thing as Maroon lands.”1
Months later, in December 2021, the JCF again challenged the sovereignty of Jamaican
Maroons by using the COVID-19 pandemic to justify an attempted shut down of the annual
January 6 celebrations of the Maroon Treaty of 1738-39. The Maroons resisted and the
celebration went ahead as planned, in defiance of the order. Colonel Currie unequivocally
defended the sovereignty of his people, citing the Maroon Treaty, and called upon the national
government to answer for what he said was another nefarious attempt by JCF troops to extort the
farmers. These recent tensions are part of a longer pattern and came just four years after Maroons
legally defended their territories against efforts by the national government of Jamaica to permit
private leases to mine Cockpit Country for bauxite. Their defense was ultimately successful, and
the Cockpit Country Protected Area was granted legal protections under the National Resources
Conservation Authority Act, which temporarily staved off mining in Maroon lands in 2017.

Adrian Frater, “Chief Curries Wants Peace, But Prepared to Fight,” Jamaica Gleaner (Kingston, Jamaica), Aug.
13, 2021, https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20210813/chief-currie-wants-peace-prepared-fight
1
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Debates over interpretations of the territoriality of Cockpit Country persisted, and in March 2022
the Jamaican Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation codified an interpretation of the
Maroon Treaty that protected some of the most disputed lands, while opening others to mining
interests.2
Each of these instances highlight the two related fronts on which the Maroons of Jamaica
continue to defend their sovereignty: interpretations of geography and the text of the Maroon
Treaty. “Successive governments, over the years,” Colonel Wallace Sterling of the Moore Town
Maroons argued in 2021, “have tried to make unilateral decisions as it relates to the treaty…It is
rather strange for anybody to be thinking at this time that we (the Maroons) do not have lands.
We do have lands and it belongs to us.”3
These tensions are not without precedent. They stem from incompatible understandings
of land use and possession that began with Spanish conquest and continued through the British
colonial era and into the independent Jamaican state. Over the course of Jamaican history postcontact, externally imposed approaches to natural resource exploitation – namely
hyperexploitative western capitalism as it evolved – have butted up against indigenous land
tenure practices that were instead based on adaptation and mutual subsistence. The tensions that
arose between these two social modalities impeded the settlement and development of plantation
agriculture in Jamaica. The Council of Trade and Plantations made this clear in 1739 when it
issued a warning to the Jamaican plantocracy that, “not one half of your lands are at present
cultivated, and that Great Britain does not reap half the benefit from your Colony, which she

“The National Resources Conservation (Cockpit Country Protected Area) Order, 2022,” The Jamaican Gazette
Supplement – Proclamations, Rules, and Regulations, vol. CXLV, no. 21 (March 18, 2022),
https://www.nepa.gov.jm/sites/default/files/2022-04/The-NRCA-Cockpit-Country-Protected-Area-Order-2022.pdf
3
Gareth Davis Sr., “Colonel Claims Treaty Gives Rights to Maroons,” Jamaica Gleaner (Kingston, Jamaica), Sept.
2, 2021, https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20210902/colonel-claims-treaty-gives-rights-maroons
2
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might do if it were fully settled.”4 Open warfare arose from the colony’s aggression toward
Maroons in response to these conditions, but the geographic battle lines were drawn far earlier.
Life in the Greater Antilles before European contact for the indigenous peoples of
Jamaica featured an array of overlapping and interlocking territorial caciques, or chieftains,
whose authority was unquestioned within the contingent space of their community. These
caciques were organized in a political configuration called a cacicazgo that was hierarchical,
with one cacique holding ultimate authority over the entire island in the case of Ayiti (later
renamed Hispaniola). The natural resources of each of the unique microclimates that make up the
landscapes of the islands of the Greater Antilles were effectively exploited by the islanders for
subsistence and conucos (crop fields) complemented what could be gathered, hunted, and
fished.5 Cassava and sweet potato were essential staples of the local diet and necessitated arable,
unforested lands for tilling and sowing. Each of these geographical regions were part of a larger,
island-wide system predicated on networks of exchange, mutual subsistence, and collaboration.
Through these networks, the indigenous peoples of Jamaica maintained stable supplies of crops
as well as protein from hutia (small rodents), turtles, fish, and mollusks.6 Spiritual practices
revolved around wooden zemis (idols) and on Jamaica burial rituals were intimately connected to
the caves of the island interior.7 Turtle shells were used as cooking tools and were widely
disseminated throughout the island. The cultural practices and networks of exchange that
constituted daily life for the indigenous necessitated an intimate knowledge of the rivers,
mountain passes, places of refuge, and sources of subsistence of Jamaica, which could only be

4

Quoted in Eric Williams, Capitalism & Slavery, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 77.
P. Allsworth-Jones, Pre-Columbian Jamaica, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2008), 23-30.
6
Allsworth-Jones, Pre-Columbian Jamaica, 23-30. It is also possible that the indigenous of all regions of Jamaica
semidomesticated the hutia.
7
Allsworth-Jones, Pre-Columbian Jamaica, 23-25.
5
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gained through experience. This knowledge was passed down through oral traditions and firsthand experience, but Taíno was not a written language.
In 1509, Juan de Esquivel declared the conquest of Jamaica under orders from Diego
Columbus. To maximize their profits, the Spanish instituted the encomienda labor system in the
colonies of the Americas in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This feudal, landbased system of enslaved labor was implemented in Jamaica in 1515 and the colonial state
assigned indigenous individuals and their caciques to conquistadors who exploited the laborers
as they saw fit.8 Conquistadors like Francisco de Garay, who traveled with Columbus on his
second voyage to the Americas, used Jamaica much in the same way that the Spanish used the
Kingdom of Granada, Madeira, and the Canary Islands. These were semi-peripheral territories
that featured a mill built on the outskirts of an urban center that was operated by the wealthiest
landowner of the community. In Jamaica, this meant either genocidal regimes based around
sugar production on the haciendas of Garay and others, or equally violent and exploitative
schemes to discover rumored, but never found, gold deposits.9 Rather than expanding settlement
and encouraging a robust local economy of raw cash crop production and luxury consumption,
Jamaica was instead the domain of whichever conquistador was granted the most arable land. In
the earliest era this was Garay, but in 1536 the Crown granted the island to the heirs of
Columbus. In both instances, there was remarkably little capital invested into the ongoing
operations of the Spanish Jamaican colony.

8

James A. Delle, Mark W. Hauser, and Douglas V. Armstrong, Out of Many, One People: The Historical
Archaeology of Colonial Jamaica, Caribbean Archaeology and Ethnohistory, (Tuscaloosa: University Alabama
Press, 2011), 39-40. There were some superficial differences between the encomienda and the system of slavery that
predominated the French and English Americas, but in practice the Spanish construct was no less exploitative,
violent, or destructive.
9
Delle, Hauser, and Armstrong, Out of Many, One People, 39-40.
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The Spanish colony of Jamaica was physically constructed in the imperial image that had
been shaped by metropolitan culture but was otherwise isolated from Spanish society. Openrange hog-rearing and sugar production seized and transformed the readily available arable land,
which had previously been used by the indigenous as semi-agricultural crop fields (conucos), and
uprooted and severely limited the mobility of the indigenous.10 The encomienda thereby
decimated the indigenous population of Jamaica by removing people from their communities and
settlements and parasitically exploiting their labor and semi-cultivated landscapes. Just as
devastating was the disruption to the networks of exchange and cooperation that had been so
central to the lives and social geographies of the indigenous of pre-contact Jamaica. Bartolomé
de las Casas famously detailed the countless atrocities he witnessed across the many colonies of
the New World in the mid-sixteenth century in Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las
Indias.11
But violent enslavement and ethnic cleansing were not the whole story in Jamaica or
elsewhere; the indigenous resisted. In the case of Jamaica, it was reported to the Crown as late as
1601 that Governor Fernando Melgarejo de Córdova had commissioned Francisco de Castro
with his personal funds to lead an expedition into the Sierra Bastidas (Blue Mountains) to
“discover” gold mines and native rebels.12 There is no further mention of this party, but we do
know definitively that no gold was ever found by Melgarejo, nor is there any record of the rebels
being captured.13 The encomienda, despite all its genocidal depredations, did not wipe out the

Verene A. Shepherd, “Livestock and Sugar: Aspects of Jamaica's Agricultural Development from the Late
Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century,” The Historical Journal 34, no. 3 (September 1991): 628.
11
Bartolomé de las Casas, Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias. (Madrid: Juan F. Hurtel, 1821).
12
Francisco Morales Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, trans. Patrick E. Bryan, Michael J. Gronow, and Francisco Oviedo
Moral (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 152-153. The party was either unsuccessful or may have never taken
place at all; a letter written by the vecinos of Villa de la Vega reached the Spanish Consejo in 1604 that detailed the
many lies and depravities committed by Melgarejo during his term as Governor.
13
John van Horne, “Documentos Del Archivo de Indias Referentes a Bernardo de Balbuena,” 1930, Bulletin of the
Royal Academy of History 96 (1930): 865-872. The indigenous population in St. Jago de la Vega – where they
10
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native population of Jamaica. They persisted in the mountainous interior alongside the colony
and in the margins of the archive.
The Spanish needed enslaved Africans to supplement indigenous labor in Spanish
Jamaica by the 1530s. In 1523, 300 enslaved laborers were consigned by the Casa de
Contratación for the colony. It is possible that a maximum of 1,000 enslaved African lived on the
island during the sixteenth century.14 By 1611, the enslaved population stood at 558 individuals,
with an additional 107 “negros horros” or, “free blacks.”15 The enslaved were put to work on the
few sugar plantations and trapiches of the colony, along with the many “hatos” or “ranches” on
the plains nearby the colonial capital. Conditions had changed, but the labor regimes instituted
by the encomienda continued to dictate the lives of enslaved Africans imported to Jamaica well
into the seventeenth century.
The indigenous approach to land tenure was both communal and collaborative. Disparate
geographic locations were independent in their immediate oversight, but intimately connected in
complementary systems of exchange that redistributed natural resources throughout the island.
This meant that regional caciques might not agree on all matters, but that the continued
functioning of the island-wide network of cacicazgos – the name of lands where the cacique held
authority – took precedent over internecine conflicts.16 Spanish colonization destroyed that social
framework, but the geographic infrastructure of pathways and spaces they navigated were
fundamental to indigenous resistance to the colony in the form of Marronage. It is for this reason
that geography is the lens through which this work analyzes and contextualizes resistance by
undoubtedly would have been enslaved for their labor or for sale – also did not increase in subsequent years, which
we know from the official census of Spanish Jamaica taken in 1611.
14
Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 153, 157.
15
“Relación verdadera y breve de Jamaica, Don Bernardo de Balbuena,” July 16, 1611, Archivo General de Indias,
Santo Domingo, leg. 177.
16
David V. Burley, Robyn P. Woodward, Shea Henry, and Ivor C. Conolley, “Jamaican Taíno Settlement
Configuration at the Time of Christopher Columbus,” Latin American Antiquity 28, no. 3 (2017): 337–52.

7
pairing maps with diverse sources such as manuscript and printed material that recount colonial
communication and legislation, Jamaican Maroon oral histories, and anthropological and
archaeological evidence to detail the lives of indigenous islanders.
The invasion of the Spanish ruptured the communal framework and uprooted the physical
settlements of the indigenous, but oral histories and cultural practices are far more difficult to
eradicate, and in Jamaica they persisted.17 During recent archaeological expeditions at Nanny
Town, the stronghold of Queen Nanny in the Blue Mountains, archaeologists uncovered a rich
tapestry of indigenous artefacts buried adjacent to a layer of indigenous earthenware intermixed
with colonial tools and materials that raises the possibility of cohabitation of the site.18 Each of
these disparate locations were part and parcel of pre-contact life for the indigenous and became
vital to geographies of resistance. Continuity between pre-contact indigenous habitation of
Jamaica and Marronage at the height of English colonialism in the eighteenth century can be
found in the isolated spaces settled and cultivated by both groups. When Nanny Town was
finally located and captured by the English in the early eighteenth it was only with the assistance
of a defector from the Maroon camp. For almost two centuries spanning Spanish and English
colonialism, the indigenous and African runaways successfully occupied and concealed the
location of this mountain settlement in their resistance to enslavement.19

17

The indigenous method for planting, harvesting, and cooking cassava into a bread-like product was vital to
settlement of the island and was demanded in ransoms by pirates who plundered St. Jago de la Vega throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
18
Harcourt Fuller and Jada Benn Torres, “Investigating the ‘Taíno’ Ancestry of the Jamaican Maroons: A New
Genetic (DNA), Historical, and Multidisciplinary Analysis and Case Study of the Accompong Town Maroons,”
Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines et
Caraïbes 43, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 47–78.
19
Emmanuel Kofi Agorsah, Maroon Heritage: Archaeological, Ethnographic, and Historical Perspectives,
(Barbados: University of the West Indies Press, 1994), 181.
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The study of maps as historical documents offers tremendous insight into the imperial
disposition toward geographic space and the indigenous resistance to that power.20 The very
decision to create a map of a territory in the first place is vested with meaning. Cartographers
may set out to record the natural world for posterity, but their commissions were often at the
behest of either empires or individuals who sought to shape that landscape for exploitation,
thereby coloring the very process from inception. “The steps in making a map,” J.B. Harley
argued, “selection, omission, simplification, classification, the creation of hierarchies, and
'symbolization'—are all inherently rhetorical.”21 Material realities were often distorted, and
silences were perpetrated within these textual mediations of reality. Understanding both the
social context and the intertextuality of maps allows us to read maps, “for alternative and
sometimes competing discourses.”22 Textual deconstructions of maps reveals the intentional and
unintentional, conscious and unconscious designs of mapmaking projects and thereby the
exercise of power and territorial authority. Maps do not actively create social dynamics, but by
prioritizing and embedding these social frameworks, maps transcend their own materiality and
become rhetorical tools of empire that can be used to shape social perspectives regarding
territorial dominion and possession. Underneath these layers of rhetoric, maps portray a version
of reality that – while distorted and mediated – can be revelatory to the material concerns and
intentions of empire during that specific period in history.
The deconstruction of maps as texts involves a process of reconstructing the specific
social frameworks that sought to conquer, dominate, and exploit the natural landscapes and

J.B. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” in The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 52-81, previously published in The Iconography of the
Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments (1988): 277-312.
21
J.B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” Cartographica 26, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 1-20.
22
Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” 20.
20
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peoples of the New World. This approach reveals a geographic outline of the violent
machinations of a colony – what Michel Foucault called the “panopticon” – which includes forts,
garrisons, and other military installments as well as the roads and plantations that the colonizers
intended to control the enslaved and protect capital investments. The goal of these regimes of
oversight, observation, and violence was to render “cheap” and “plentiful” enslaved labor as
passive and thereby pliant and infinitely exploitable. This, however, was not the reality of
colonial life; resistance was omnipresent, enslaved Africans constantly tested the bounds of
authority, and dominion was assailed both from within the plantations and from those beyond
Jamaican shores. In their attempts to map a reality that represented a neat, uniform image of
colonial dominion that totalized the geographic space of the territory, cartographers also
inadvertently outlined where it could not be exercised. Blank spaces were not merely
unconquered or unincorporated space, but rather spaces where the colony – and thereby the
empire – failed to project or maintain authority. In these vacuums of imperial authority, those
who rejected the imposition of the colonial order occupied these liminal spaces. Cartographers,
in their quest to map empire, unintentionally outlined the spaces in which indigenous and
African resistance found refuge and subsistence.
My research also prioritizes anthropology and archaeology to approximate how the
indigenous lived pre-contact and how Marronage in Jamaica evolved over time. I will use these
sources alongside the colonial record to reveal the lines of resistance that appear as blank space
on imperial maps and in imperial archives. This narrative of resistance does not reject the
colonial record and instead embraces the biases laden in these documents to better understand the
intentions of the colony during both the Spanish and English eras. Archival sources from Spanish
Jamaica are limited due to the destruction wrought during and after the English invasion of 1655,
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[Figure 1.1] Adapted from: Kenneth Bilby, Drums of Defiance: Maroon Music from the Earliest Free Black
Communities of Jamaica, CD and liner notes (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian/Folkways Recordings), SF 40412.

but numerous valuable accounts remain that detail how the colony functioned and the extent and
nature of settlement. For the years comprising English Jamaica, deeds, land surveys, and requests
for support in the form of capital, soldiers, and fortifications complement these sources and help
to reconstruct more hyperlocalized outlines of the spaces where Jamaican Maroons and colonial
settlers clashed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By understanding the
geographic shape and social foundations of resistance in Jamaican history, we problematize the
very nature of colonialism and imperialism.
In June of 2016, I attended and took part in the Eighth Annual Charles Town Maroon
Conference near Buff Bay on the northeastern end of Jamaica [see Figure 1.1]. Charles Town is
situated on the banks of the Buff Bay River, which originates in the Blue Mountain range in
between Silver Hill Peak and Catherine’s Peak and is home to the descendants of a branch of
Maroons led in the Maroon Wars by the famous leader Quao. Over time, Charles Town became
sacred grounds for Jamaican Maroons because of its large cemetery. During the weekend of the
conference, attendees observed a funeral procession and witnessed as every member of Charles
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Town, along with Maroons from across the island and from as far away as Sierra Leone, paid
respects to and remembered their loved ones. The processional ceremony was solemn at times
and emotionally charged at others, vacillating between rhythmic drumming and outbursts of grief
and celebration as each member of the community honored the fallen and ushered them to their
final earthly resting place. Each step of the ceremony emphasized the connection between
Maroons and their natural surroundings, beginning at the meeting grounds in their village in the
shadow of the Blue Mountains, proceeding to Buff Bay River led by drummers, and then back
through a well-worn path in the bush to the cemetery amidst a grove of massive, old growth
trees. The participants imbibed and sprayed libations across the grounds and the body of their
loved one in a practice tied intimately to West African burial rituals, especially in Akan
communities.23 Each element of these burial rituals speak to the nature of Marronage in the
context of Jamaica: a reverence for and reliance on the natural landscape, the importation and
adaptation of disparate West African traditions to suit new surroundings, and an unwavering
resistance to the stifling external pressures of imperialism.
During my time in Charles Town, fellow conference participants and I dined with Chief
Michael Grizzle of the Trelawny Town-Flagstaff Maroons and engaged in a group discussion
about Marronage and its place in the history of Jamaica. Chief Grizzle spoke at length about
indigeneity, stating unequivocally that Maroons are the indigenous peoples of Jamaica and that
their resistance was against more than enslavement. “The ancestors did not simply reject colonial
rule and enslavement,” he told the group, “They opposed Western civilization in its entirety,
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which includes capitalism.”24 In his conceptualization of Marronage, Chief Grizzle emphasized a
common ancestry with, as well as a spiritual connection to, the native peoples of Jamaica.25
According to this framework, indigeneity and Marronage are inextricably linked and resistance
to the modalities of capitalism is inherited. Although I will distinguish between the indigenous
and the Maroons of Jamaica throughout this work as a means of periodizing and advancing the
narrative of resistance, this does not mean that indigenous Jamaican peoples and Jamaican
Maroons are unconnected. On the contrary, the indigenous first engaged in Marronage as a
response to invasion, conquest, and enslavement and as a means of maintaining the “fugitive
ecologies” that were so central to pre-contact life. Mapping out these indigenous landscapes and
the geographies they compose offers a means of bridging the knowledge gap between that which
was recorded by imperial occupiers and experienced by those who resisted occupation.
Indigenous and African resistance to imperialism and enslavement challenges historical
teleologies that depict conquest as a linear process with neat chronological sequences. Such
histories of colonialism assume the dominance and preeminence of European empires and
obscure resistance, which was ceaseless and omnipresent. Indigenous peoples as well as enslaved
Africans resisted the conditions imposed on them by imperialism in every conceivable manner,
every step of the way. Maps depict the places in which resistance found refuge and strength as
blank, unsettled and unincorporated space, but nevertheless as part and parcel of the larger
landscape of European dominion. For example, we know from Mavis Campbell’s archival
research in The Maroons of Jamaica that the Maroons of the northeast of the island nearby Port
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Antonio relied on natural sources of salt to complement their subsistence diets, which also
necessitated means of accessing these sources. Colonial roads and pathways were patrolled by
local militias, so Maroons had to make use of alternative routes in areas beyond the reach of the
English. This meant that despite the biases of maps and the imperial archive, cartographers
unknowingly outlined the geographies of resistance, places of refuge and subsistence that were
connected by an infrastructure of pathways.
The narrative framework this dissertation employs begins with a comprehensive survey
of indigenous Jamaicans and the African societies from which the enslaved of Spanish and
English Jamaica were captured. Making use of the work of archaeologists and anthropologists
affords the opportunity to speak about the indigenous of Jamaica with some degree of certainty.
Returning to this base of knowledge during an analysis of imperial archival documents and
maps, especially regarding the era of Spanish Jamaica, helps to locate the history of the
indigenous of the island.
The creation of maps of the Caribbean and the Greater and Lesser Antilles was largely
dominated by the Dutch during the first century of New World imperialism. Cartographers like
Abraham Artelius, Gerard Mercatur, Joost de Hondt, and Willem Blaeu were pioneers in
mapmaking, creating privately commissioned and marketed maps that depicted the lands claimed
by the various European powers. These maps were dramatically different from those
commissioned on behalf of the Spanish Crown. Rather than reflecting imperial priorities, the
Dutch maps depicted the natural landscape of the island and its natural resources. Maps and land
surveys were fundamental to two processes that emerged during the early seventeenth century:
the enclosure and privatization of land as possession and the scientific push to catalog and
categorize nature. This proto-capitalistic push coincided with the Enlightenment focus on
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recording and defining the natural resources of imperial territories to transform English
colonialism. When the English invaded and conquered the island from the Spanish, Maroons
adapted to the strategies they employed. Maps of Jamaica did not include what I call
“geographies of resistance” because the way these populations used the land was in direct
conflict with the early modernist approach to colonialism. These were configurations of space
within territories claimed by imperial conquest but wherein imperial authority could not be
exercised, and dominion could not be forcibly maintained. This vacuum allowed networks of
subsistence composed by rival ecologies to persist. These geographies of Jamaica predated,
withstood, and outlasted colonialism, and tell a story of indigeneity unbound by European
imperialism.26Maroon communities during the Spanish and English eras created what Sarah L.
Lincoln calls “fugitive ecologies.” Lincoln defined the term in the context of postcolonial
literature context to signify, “a dispossession of self in relation to the environment, a refusal to
conceive of land, soil or planet in terms of property.”27 Subsistence and semi-agricultural fields
planted by Maroons, enslaved Africans, and the indigenous – which compose “fugitive
ecologies” – were not part of the colonial economy. These fields would have merely signified to
colonists that the land was arable and exploitable.
In the context of Spanish versus English Jamaica, the pressures and geographic borders of
the colony presented complex challenges and pressures. Blank spaces on the maps of the island,
both Spanish and English, therefore provide the geographical outlines of those “fugitive
ecologies” practiced by Maroons across centuries of imperialism. The fugitivity of these
indigenous ecologies is defined in contrast to the hyper-exploitative ecologies of colonial
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plantations. As Chief Grizzle put it: “The ancestors…opposed Western civilization in its entirety,
which includes capitalism.” The idea of a fugitive ecology is essential to what Chief Grizzle
described as a crucial anti-Western, anti-capitalist ethos in Marronage: a space in which Maroon
communities refused, “to conceive of land, soil or planet in terms of property.” This work
contends that blank spaces on maps unintentionally outlined the geographies of those fugitive
ecologies.
If we use the geographic frameworks of colonialism as the photographic negative against
which Marronage manifested and shaped itself, we can better interpret the realities of resistance
across time. Interpreting blank spaces as the outlines of fugitive ecologies adds depth and context
to the analysis of maps and imperial sources. Understanding how the various individuals who
fled enslavement understood the world and interacted with and manipulated the natural
landscape around them allows us as researchers to conceptualize the materiality of indigeneity.
Fusing the approach outlined by Harley and others for translating the intertextuality of maps with
this knowledge of those who composed indigenous resistance in Jamaica not only finds meaning
in the blank spaces mapped by empire, but also attempts to fill in those blanks by reading against
and along the bias grain of Spanish and English archives for traces of the marginalized and those
forces that engendered marginalization.28 Reading against the bias grain reveals what is between
the lines of archival sources, while reading along the bias grain highlights the social conditions
that shaped life in Jamaica.
We know from the Spanish colonial archive that indigenous and African runaways, or
“Maroons,” who fled into the mountains of Jamaica became a nuisance to vecinos, or residents of
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the capital of St. Jago de la Vega, as early as 1512.29 It is also clear in the archival record that the
vecinos of la Vega in the early seventeenth century were reliant on the many hatos – circular
clearings used in raising large livestock – occupied and operated by the indigenous on the plains
of Clarendon.30 Spanish censuses accounted for more than one hundred known indigenous
persons occupying the island during this period as well.31 The Spanish committed genocide
against the indigenous of Jamaica in their attempts to exploit the island, but these people resisted
and remained when the English invaded in 1655. They subsisted and survived using the same
adaptive strategies that formed the bedrock of their pre-contact societies; resisting in the
mountains and persisting on the plains, occupying those allegedly blank spaces on maps that
Spanish colonists ignored whenever possible and English colonists failed to incorporate. The
indigenous, as was always contended in oral historical records, were the ancestors of those who
became the Jamaican Maroons.32 Locating sites of indigenous resistance allows us to build out
the framework of indigenous geographies of resistance and reveals the limits of imperialism over
time and problematizes neat, linear teleologies of conquest and exploitation. In this manner,
resistance becomes the central, organizing narrative to the history of Jamaica.
Resistance to colonialism within Jamaica did not exist in a vacuum. Invasions from
European imperial rivals, like the piratical raids of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and
the French invasion of 1694-95, and natural disasters like the destructive earthquake of 1692
were material factors in the colonization of the island. These events devastated the colonial
economy and populace of St. Jago de la Vega (or Spanish Town as it was known to the English)
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and invariably shaped resistance to it. Much like their predecessors facing Spanish colonialism,
the Jamaican Maroons of the English era operated on the periphery of the colony itself but were
nonetheless impacted by these events. Maroon populations swelled with the arrival of new
plantation runaways who fled amidst the panic and destruction wrought during the 1690s. These
communities – in manners different but no less impactful – also grappled with the effects of
hurricanes, earthquakes, and invasions like their colonist counterparts. Maroons were not
bystanders to Jamaican history, despite what the colonial record might lead you to believe: they
lived, worked, communed, and created societies that withstood the onslaught of imperialism and
shaped the world around them. The history and present of Jamaica are born out of this resistance.

18
2

“JAMAICA O SANTIAGO,” SPANISH MAPPING, COLONIALISM, AND
STAGNATION IN JAMAICA, 1509-1655

Warriors armed with spears gathered in canoes on the island coast in alarm as a pair of
Spanish caravels drew near to the shore. The massive wooden vessels dwarfed the resistance
force, but the warriors pressed onward. Volley after volley of spears were hurled by the warriors
but bounced off the hulls of the ships and fell innocuously into the sea. The captain aboard the
nearest caravel countered. He sent a boat of Spanish crossbowmen ashore along with a hunting
dog that was unleashed on those who had gathered on the beach to repel the arrivals. The
mechanized bows rained bolts down on the defensive force, who at last relented in the face of
inevitable destruction. The European interlopers parlayed with the cacique, or head of the local
community, with assistance from an indigenous captive and guide. The sides soon arrived at a
tenuous peace, consecrated by an exchange of gifts to signify supposed mutual respect. This
violent meeting was the first introduction of the indigenous peoples of Xamayca (Jamaica) to
Christopher Columbus and his Spanish Conquistadors.33
The resistance that the Indigenous people waged against Columbus and his men during
the first contact remained a looming threat to the Spaniards on subsequent transatlantic voyages
despite the arrangements that they made with various local caciques.34 The will of Diego
Mendez, who sailed with Columbus on his fateful fourth and final voyage to Jamaica in 1503
when the captain and his crew were marooned on the island, suggests that authority among the
island’s indigenous population was distributed amongst regional caciques who were the
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unquestioned executive power within that community. Mendez plied the leader of each
indigenous settlement with gifts and displays of fidelity to negotiate for provisions for the
stranded Spaniards, and he always adapted to local customs.35 The provisions that Mendez
acquired from the indigenous people were all that stood between the Spaniards and desolation
and starvation. Despite the establishment of these diplomatic relations, upon his return to
Jamaica Columbus was paranoid about the intentions of the indigenous; the aged Admiral
believed that their indigenous saviors could turn on them at any moment. Mendez did not doubt
the sincerity of the caciques he encountered, but also understood – like Columbus – that their
arrangements would not last forever; the men stranded with Columbus were restless and
ungenerous to their indigenous benefactors. In this profound moment of desperation, the Spanish
had to navigate indigenous social geographies of pre-contact Jamaica for survival. Adherence to
the customs and authority of each regional cacique, who in turn dictated where they could safely
travel and with whom they could trade, was essential.36
The Spaniards stranded on the fourth voyage were entirely dependent on the indigenous
for survival once their victuals were exhausted. As the months dragged on, the tenuous peace
between the two populations – in large part because of tensions within the camps of the
Spaniards themselves – began to crack.37 Columbus resolved to send a rescue party with
indigenous rowers and guides across the Jamaica Channel to neighboring Ayti for rescue. When
no one volunteered to undertake the 120-mile journey across deep and rough waters, Columbus
turned again to Mendez to carry out the treacherous voyage. The journey across the open sea
proved to be the least of their worries. In one instance, a band of indigenous rebels attacked and
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robbed the canoe captained by Mendez and they were forced to turn back, delaying their
crossing. Even upon arrival their arrival at Hispaniola, Mendez and his crew were taken captive
by a local cacique and were later forced to wait in the colonial capital of Santo Domingo for
months as the fate of Columbus and the Spanish on Jamaica hung in the balance.38 As the
stranded Spaniards waited, ignorant to the predicament of Mendez and his crew, Captain
Francisco de Porras and his brother Diego raised two successive mutinous rebellions against
Columbus’s leadership. The rebels failed, both in their attempts to usurp Columbus and in a
subsequent attempt to make a crossing in canoes to Santo Domingo.39 The Porras brothers and
their fellow insurgents then returned to Jamaica and began ransacking the indigenous settlement
of Maima.40 The devastation they wrought made the Spanish presence on the island untenable for
the indigenous people, while Columbus and his loyalists insisted that these men were villainous
scoundrels. Some caciques continued to trade with and aid the Spaniards, others attacked and
sabotaged the camps, and still others kept their distance.41 The Europeans’ guns, crossbows, and
hunting dogs did little to dissuade caciques from pushing back when the Spanish treated them
badly and took liberties with their generosity.
The indigenous resisted, assisted, avoided, and harassed the Spanish, sometimes
violently, throughout these early years. The episode in which indigenous rebels attacked and
robbed the canoe captained by Mendez further highlights the lack of uniformity in indigenous
interactions with the Spanish. Despite the existence of an island-wide hierarchy and the authority
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of caciques, rulers across different regions of the island acted independently. These dynamics of
indigenous society in Jamaica organized life before European contact.
The Spanish constructed their early colonial settlements near indigenous villages as a
means of instituting and streamlining the hyperexploitative encomienda labor system, which
assigned enslaved indigenous populations to conquistadors who then used the laborers as they
saw fit. Physical proximity to these villages, which were usually located in the low-lying hills
that border the coastal plains in the vicinity of fresh water sources, facilitated the enslavement of
indigenous laborers.42 The Spanish, therefore, in a very literal sense grafted colonialism onto
indigenous geographies.43 Nearly a century and a half later, the English repeated this process
during their capture of Spanish Jamaica. In both instances, the European invaders ignored or
failed to appreciate the intricate networks of island-wide and inter-island exchange and
communication that was vital to the ecologies practiced by the indigenous and their Maroon
descendants and successors.44 The European colonists were preoccupied with the
hyperexploitation of natural resources and labor, blinding them to the infrastructures that
supported indigenous settlements across Jamaica.
Indigenous resistance is central to understanding the history and present of Jamaica. It
represents the persistence of a way of life that was shaped and informed by the natural
landscapes and cultural geographies of the island. This way of life transcends the timeline and
reductive teleologies of European imperialism. Resistance to imperialism in Jamaican history is
intimately linked, whether consciously or not, to indigenous geographies and knowledge.
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Enslaved and freed Africans and the indigenous worked and lived nearby one another for more
than a century. The enslaved of Spanish Jamaica – indigenous and African alike – lived either on
haciendas (plantations) or in the hatos on the periphery of Villa de la Vega [Figure 2.1]. Work on
the hatos provided the enslaved with greater autonomy and required mastery of the natural
landscape to range herds and wrangle runaways. The Spanish preferred the indigenous for their
knowledge of the surroundings, but over time transitioned to importing enslaved Africans to
either complement or supplement this ranching population. Individuals from these populations of
disparate origin formed kinship bonds in these experiences.45 Kinship bonds facilitated the
formation of syncretic identites that fused the traditions and beliefs of each society and gave
birth to unique forms of resistance against imperialism.

[Figure 2.1] Hatos y Rios de Jamaica, from Francisco Morales Padrón's Spanish Jamaica, this map provides the
rough location of the many rivers and ranches of Jamaica under Spanish colonialism.
Map Taken from Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 160.
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2.1

The African Origins of Resistance in Jamaica
By 1375 CE, the Mpemba Kasi Kingdom and the Mbata Kingdom merged to form the

Kingdom of Kongo in the western African region that is today occupied by the countries Angola,
Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The House of Kilukeni, as the orchestrators of
what was an amicable union of powerful families, ruled the kingdom over the course of the next
two centuries, constantly expanding the territory. This process allowed the rulers to maintain and
consolidate power, which inevitably created jealousies and rivalries within other houses.46 By the
time Portuguese explorers led by Diogo Cão traveled down the Congo River in search of the
mythic Christian king Prester John in 1483, the Kingdom of Kongo was the most powerful in all
of Africa and featured a hierarchical society with a robust infrastructure that was technologically
advanced and was broadly prosperous for those in power.47
Cão arrived in the region a century into the House of Kilukeni’s reign, at which point
external regional rivals had been – temporarily – subjugated and rendered as sources for slaving
campaigns.48 Whereas previous Portuguese explorations had consisted of raiding and slaving
parties along the western coastline, this journey sought the interior of the continent and its fabled
riches. Cão witnessed that the Kingdom of Kongo had its own currency, a functioning domestic
market (largely based on slavery), and an effective transportation infrastructure that both
impressed and awed the Iberians. The King at that time, Nzinga a Nkuwu, engaged in a cultural
exchange with the Portuguese, sending Kongo nobles to Europe, while hosting men left by Cão.
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Nkuwu also briefly converted to Christianity and in short order so had his son – who would
prove to be a devoted Christian – and the nobility of Kongo.49
By the time the Spanish colony on the island of Jamaica was established by Juan de
Esquivel in 1507, Afonso I had assumed the throne from his father Nzinga a Nkuwu. The
Portuguese and Afonso I established a mutually beneficial political and economic relationship
whereby the Portuguese tapped into the slave and ivory markets of Kongo and in return the
Kongo received fire-armed support in their war against the Teke and access to the European
markets and cultural currents.50 Before long, the Spanish, through the Portuguese, gained access
to the slave trade by way of the asiento, a royal contract that gave monopoly control to the
Spanish over the distribution of enslaved African labor to its colonies. The first persons of
African descent likely arrived in Jamaica with Juan de Esquivel himself, but by 1523 Spanish
colonists had become desperate for enslaved laborers to maintain the colony. For this reason, the
Spanish Crown consigned 300 enslaved Africans for the island. The Spanish Crown also
mandated that African women be sent along with the men to provide wives for the enslaved.
Within the decade, the Crown sent another 700 enslaved Africans, but Spanish Jamaican
colonists remained far from satisfied. As of the Balbuena census of 1611 – which gathered its
numbers through recorded confessions rather than a true headcount – there were 107 “negros
libres” and 558 “esclavos” accounted for in Spanish Jamaica, which colonists decried as
insufficient.51
The Teke were a Bantu speaking people who were known as traders, hunters, and
fishermen and they domesticated dogs and cats to assist in these endeavors. Above all else,
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however, they were famous for their fighting abilities. The Teke violently opposed the expansion
of the Kingdom of Kongo and were poised to win their war against it were it not for the
firepower provided by the Portuguese. The Mbundu were a more agricultural people who waged,
and eventually lost, a near two-decade war against both the Kingdom of Kongo and Portuguese
Angola. As was the practice at the time in Africa and throughout much of European history prior,
the soldiers of the any vanquished foe presented a quandary to the victors. The defeated soldiers
remained a threat if the victors did not deal with them decisively. Two options for punishment
were enslavement or execution and enslavement was more profitable. However, it was not only
defeated soldiers who were captured, enslaved, and sent to the New World; entire societies were
targeted. In this genocidal process, the agricultural traditions of the Mbundu and the trading,
hunting, and fishing of the Teke also made their way across the Atlantic Ocean. Evidence of this
exists in the archival records of both the Spanish and English, who detailed the skills of the
enslaved and freed African population as ranchers in the hatos, hunters in the woods, and by the
existence and persistence of West African cooking traditions, herbs, and grains like rice that
made their way to Jamaica.52 While the traditions and experiences of the enslaved African
peoples of Spanish Jamaica do not and cannot account for the entirety of the enslaved experience
of that era, when paired with our knowledge of the indigenous garnered from anthropological
and archaeological studies conducted on the island and limited mentions in the imperial archives,
we can begin to imagine the subtleties and contours of indigeneity and early Marronage.
The vast majority of the enslaved brought to Jamaica by the Spanish throughout the
second half of the sixteenth century were illegally imported from ships hailing from Angola, a
coastal Portuguese colony in western Africa south of the Kingdom of Kongo. This meant that by
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the turn of the seventeenth century, the enslaved population of Spanish Jamaica was almost
exclusively composed of Bantu speaking peoples of the region constituted today by Angola, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Republic of Congo and the remaining indigenous
population on the island.53 These African peoples shared experiences even prior to their
enslavement, as they all hailed from societies that resisted the expansionary aims of the Kingdom
of Kongo and their Portuguese allies. This meant that a sizeable percentage of the enslaved
African population of Spanish Jamaica arrived with prior working knowledge of imperialism and
especially Portuguese efforts at colonizing Africa. This population was sub-divided into two
distinct social groups: the horros (freedmen) and the enslaved.54 Despite having obtained
freedom, the horros of Spanish Jamaica were relegated to an inferior social standing than that of
the vecinos and moradores, who were of Spanish or other European descent. Horros could not
hold office or legally own land in Villa de la Vega, but along with the “mulattoes” were an
important part of the island’s meager cavalry and defense militias. Based on the observations of
Vázquez de Espinosa, the horros lived as peasants on the rural periphery of the colony.
We also know that social and cultural traditions of the enslaved African population of
Spanish Jamaica survived the transatlantic voyage. In the 1610s another priest, Antonio Vázquez
de Espinosa, journeyed to the Americas to preach and work in the Spanish American colonies.
Like Balbuena, Vázquez de Espinosa recorded his observations during his travels. During his
time in Jamaica, the Spanish priest did not conduct an official census, but wrote that there were,
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“more than 1,000 black slaves and mulattoes.”55 This population, he continued, “occupy
themselves in the field in the cattle ranches, hatos, and works of corn, tobacco…rice, cassava,
and some honey trapiches.” In these rural spaces of Spanish Jamaica, where colonial authority
was tenuous and the enslaved could grow whichever subsistence crops they chose, we see the
organic blending of African and indigenous ecological competencies through the cultivation of
corn, tobacco, rice, and cassava. Rice cultivation was dependent on agricultural knowledge
brought from Africa, while corn, tobacco, and cassava were semi-cultivated in Jamaica long
before the arrival of the Spanish.56 The history of rice cultivation in the Americas is intimately
linked to the provision grounds of enslaved Africans, as well as the settlements of Maroons and
Quilombos.57 Additionally, the labor required for tasks like cattle ranching and honey cultivation
was specialized and implies a certain amount of personal freedom to tend to ranging herds and
hives. In this way, Vázquez de Espinosa paints a far more nuanced and detailed image of the
daily lives of the Spanish Jamaican population than Balbuena, describing an island where
inhabitants supplemented their lack of imports from Seville and neighboring Spanish territories
with subsistence production on the island. Much like Balbuena, however, he emphasizes the
meagerness of the colonial population, the island’s defenses, and the limited footprint of the
colony, which remained confined to the vicinity of Villa de la Vega.
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2.2

La Reconquista: Spanish Imperialism and the Colonization of Jamaica in the
Sixteenth Century
Its existence on the periphery of the Spanish empire had an indelible impact on the

settlement and land usage of colonial Jamaica. The Spanish Crown – which will be used as a
stand-in for the monarchs who governed over the united kingdoms of Castile and Aragon during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries beginning with Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon
– did not invest substantial capital in its Caribbean territories. The Casa de Contratación
governed trade by Spanish colonies in the New World and mandated that all commerce must be
conducted with the port of Seville, where the Casa de Contratación was located, and using
Spanish currency that was in short supply in territories like Jamaica. Spanish Jamaican colonists
regularly complained that many years passed between the arrival of Spanish ships to the
Jamaican ports.58 The routes of the New Spain fleet – by which all Spanish commerce and
thousands of Spaniards entered the Americas each year – simply bypassed Jamaica altogether. In
1608, one such fleet carried 1,028 passengers bound for the New World and of this coterie only
one person intended to visit Jamaica and only on their way to their ultimate destination of Tierra
Firme.59 By the seventeenth century, the vecinos of Villa de la Vega (renamed St. Jago de la
Vega by the English and known today as Spanish Town) relied entirely on subsistence
agriculture, small-scale local production, and contraband. Each year more and more left the
island for more lucrative colonies or to return to Spain.
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The union of Spanish kingdoms forged in the Reconquista quickly became dependent on
the wealth extracted from the mines of Tierra Firme to repay the overwhelming debts accrued in
European warfare.60 Ventures that did not require significant financing in the form of gold or
silver, but promised unfathomable returns in the form of mineral wealth, were prioritized.61 Early
modern maps of the Spanish Americas are imbued with this perspective; locations that offered
sources of wealth were richly detailed. The detailed topographies of Nueva España – which
includes present day Mexico, parts of Central America, and the southern United States –

[Figure 2.2] Luis de Velasco, Mapa de la costa y parte de la provincia de Venezuela, No Scale, March 7, 1590,
Maps and Plans - Venezuela, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, MP-VENEZUELA,276.
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contrasted with the relative featurelessness of Jamaica and other Caribbean colonies make these
differences plain [Figure 2.2]. The maps of Tierra Firme – which included the lands that are
today Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana – emphasize the imperial prioritization of territories,
such as the Amazon rainforest, the Andes Mountains, and the vast circulatory systems of rivers
and waterways are recorded in exhaustive detail.62
The era of colonial Spanish Jamaica formally began when Juan de Esquivel declared
conquest in 1509 under orders from Diego Columbus, heir to Christopher. Within a year, the
Spanish constructed the first permanent settlement Sevilla la Nueva on the northern coast of the
island alongside three indigenous villages in the vicinity of what today is St. Ann’s Bay [Figure
2.3].63 This began nearly a century and a half of genocidal exploitation by the Spanish as they
parasitically grafted the various settlements that constituted the colony onto indigenous
geographies and networks of subsistence.64 The Spanish understood land tenure and possession
in semi-feudal terms, of which the encomienda labor system was part and parcel. Each semifeudal lord of early sixteenth century Spanish Jamaica was apportioned groups of enslaved
indigenous Jamaicans in the guise of Catholic salvation and exploited their labor either in cash
crop fields on the island or in the mines of Tierra Firme. In this part feudal, part agrarian
capitalist construct, land was not cleared and converted into plantations for the purposes of agroindustrial production; instead, the Spanish engaged in small-scale production of sugar, cassava,
cattle, and pigs. Ships rarely visited Jamaica and any plantations or agricultural operations on the
island were only intended to provide victuals to conquistadors in search of mineral riches on
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Tierra Firme or small-scale export and sale in local Caribbean markets.65 A 1536 court case
decided in favor of the Columbus estate further constrained investment into Jamaica, placing the
island under the family’s absentee, oligarchic rule.66 The Audiencia of Santo Domingo and the
Crown generally ignored affairs in Jamaica for the remainder of the sixteenth century.67
Spanish-commissioned maps of Jamaica from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are
exceedingly rare and only eight remain, including maps of fortifications and harbors. Each of
these maps were produced in the wake of English conquest and reflect an imperial preoccupation

[Figure 2.3] Don Jacinto Sedeño de Albornoz, Ysla de Xamaica, Scale ca. 10 leagues: 90 mm, 1656, Maps and Plans
– Santo Domingo, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 53.
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with maintaining possession of the island.68 The commissioned maps of island territories like
Jamaica alongside concurrent pleas and reports to the Crown authored by vecinos of the colony
demonstrate how the Spanish outlined dominion and how they perceived of and structured these
peripheral colonial spaces. The segregation of living spaces around the administrative and
ecclesiastical centers established means by which Spanish colonists could impose social
hierarchies on the colonial space. In the case of Jamaica, Francisco Garay governed the colony
from 1514-1523, during which time individual agricultural operations like sugar production
operated on the organizing logic of agrarian capitalism, while colonial society itself retained
rigid, hierarchical feudal characteristics of the medieval era. Enslaved indigenous and African
populations grew, milled, and readied sugar for sale in Jamaica in this era, but the profits of all
saleable production of the island belonged to Garay alone.69 The ability to structure colonial
society and enforce a particular order within the contingent spaces of a claimed territory was
fundamental to the exercise of colonial dominion. Garay did not commission any maps because
he did not want to attract interest and the Crown had almost no investment in the island. In this
way, the absence of mapping altogether is itself vested with meaning.70 The imperial process of
mapping space possesses both tangible and rhetorical dimensions. The act of representing what
Marisa Fuentes calls the “geographies of domination” outlined by the built environment of the
colony was predicated on a specific concept of colonial hegemony that both informed the making
of the map, while the production of the map also inherently shaped knowledge regarding these
places and spaces.71
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The inclusion of specific natural resources or geographical features alongside the
omission of others on imperial maps grew out of imperial priorities and preoccupations; Spanish
cartographers constructed maps with a certain subjectivity as a natural extension of their royal
commissions.72 The Spanish Crown and conquistadors were fixated on Tierra Firme and its
mineral resources to the detriment of Caribbean colonial maps. Maps, as a reflection of imperial
priorities, in turn influenced attitudes held by royals, religious factors, and administrators alike
regarding these peripheral territories and thereby dissuaded interest and investment in places like
Jamaica.73
The featureless spaces depicted by Spanish maps of Jamaica emphasize what this work
understands as liminal or contested spaces. These regions of the island remained unoccupied by
Spanish settlement and were ignored by the colony. These liminal spaces were the product of
indigenous geographies of resistance; the continued occupation and defense of these landscapes
offered refuge to freed and enslaved runaways and afrodescendientes, those persons descended
from African ancestors, just as it had offered the indigenous islanders who fled subjugation by
the colonists.74 Blank spaces on maps therefore inadvertently demarcated where the Spanish
were powerless and rival geographies of indigenous and Maroon Jamaica persisted and
flourished.75 A thorough examination of these spaces alongside the colony and the disparate and
incompatible social geographies of each offers remarkable insight into the exercise of dominion
and the rationalization of hierarchy on the colonial frontier.76 What legacies were imparted by
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these divergent imperial geographies and approaches to the management of colonial territories
and how did they independently interact with the persistent presence of indigenous geographies
of resistance?
2.3

Mapping Spanish Jamaica
Spanish maps of the Americas prior to 1654-55 are scarce and at the time of their creation

were of the utmost secrecy as a means of hoarding cartographic knowledge of the New World. In
the sixteenth century, Jamaica was typically mapped as part of larger cartographic works that
featured territories like Nueva España, Tierra Firme, and Florida. Jamaica, in comparison, was of
little importance to the Spanish Empire and maps and atlases that included the island present a
flat, featureless landscape with inconsistently named ports. The earliest official Spanish map of
the New World is believed to have been the 1500 Planisferio de Juan de la Cosa [Figure 2.4]. It
is the first attempt to cartographically depict the lands encountered by Columbus and the first
representation of Jamaica as well. On this map, Jamaica appears as little more than a brown

[Figure 2.4] Juan de la Cosa, Planisferio de Juan de la Cosa, [map], 960 x 1830 mm, (Madrid: Naval Museum of
Madrid, 1500).
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smudge with the temporary names of ports listed. The Padrón Real was created in 1507 based on
similar information gained through transatlantic voyages and includes very little topographical
detail or placenames of the Americas. The Padrón Real was updated and reinterpreted several
times before being renamed the Padrón General in 1527 and became the official map of the
Spanish Empire. The Casa de Contratación governed the creation of the maps and would
interrogate returning ship captains under oath to verify any new information about the Americas.
It was not until 1542 when an influential cosmographer of the Casa de Contratación
named Alonso de Santa Cruz created a map of the islands of the Greater Antilles, the Islario
General De Todas Las Islas Del Mundo, that the few settlements like Sevilla and Melilla and the

[Figure 2.5] Alonso de Santa Cruz, Jamaica o Santiago, No Scale Given, in Islario General De Todas Las
Islas Del Mundo, 1542, 641.
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churches of Spanish Jamaica made an appearance [Figure 2.5].77 Santa Cruz set out specifically
to, “describe in maps something about all the parts of the world, putting in each province the
cities, places, rivers, mountains, and other notable things. I will do the same for the West Indies,
now rediscovered, and where I have been.”78 The Spanish cosmographer was also a contino, or
attendant of the king, and resided part-time at the court. As such, he was given special
dispensations by Charles V and tutored future King of Spain Philip II in the sciences. Given
these connections to wealth and power, Santa Cruz was emboldened in his personal
cartographical pursuits and became the singular cosmographical voice guiding the Spanish
Empire by 1560. Less than a decade later, another cosmographer with the Casa de Contratación
attempted a map of the world that again included the Americas and Jamaica. The Planisferio de
Sancho Gutierrez was created in 1551 and is clearly influenced by the work of Santa Cruz and
the famous navigator Sebastian Cabot. This map includes details that had not previously
appeared on maps of Jamaica, including placenames that remain to this day, such as: Puerto de
Anton (Port Antonio) on the northeastern coast, Punto de Morante (Morant Point) on the
southeastern coast, and Punto de Negrillo (Negril Point) on the far western end of the island.
Gutierrez also mapped some distinctive natural features of the island, like the many small cays
laying off the coast, and provided locations for the original settlements Melilla, Sevilla, and
Oristan Viejo. Despite the lack of topography, this early map of Jamaica would remain the most
thorough map of the island for more than a century.
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Later Spanish cartographical depictions of Jamaica contained fewer placenames and did
not advance geographic knowledge of the island, at least in part because possession of the colony
was awarded to the Columbus family in 1536.79 Juan Lopez de Velasco created a map of the
Caribbean in 1575 that shows Jamaica as a featureless, but properly located, blob amidst the
Spanish shipping routes between the Americas and Spain. Nicolás de Cardona spent twelve years
exploring the Caribbean and the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts of Nueva España for pearl fisheries
before creating his Descripciones geográficas e hidrográficas de muchas tierras y mares del
Norte y Sur en las Indias, which he completed in 1632 [Figure 2.6]. This collection of maps of

[Figure 2.6] Nicolás de Cardona, La Ysla de Xamaica, No Scale, in Descripciones geográphicas e hydrográphicas de
muchas tierras y mares del Norte y Sur en las Indias, en especial del descubrimiento del Reino de la California,
Manuscript Collection, National Library of Spain, Madrid, mss/2468.
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islands and territories in the Americas included a depiction and brief description of Jamaica.
Cardona noted that there was a long river that emptied into a harbor that possessed a shipyard on
the southeastern coast. Shortly after colonizing the island, Juan de Esquivel founded a port on the
southern coast named “Puerto Esquivel” in what is today “Old Harbour,” into which the longest
river in Jamaica, the Rio Minho, empties.80 Cardona also includes Punto del Negrillo, stating that
it is “where the enemy hides.” Despite these accurate details of the harbors and coastline of the
southside of the island, Cardona seems to have known little about the topography or inhabitants
of the island beyond the location of the capital, which he incorrectly names “Ciudad de
Xamaica.” The mapmaker roughly sketched some trees and a town in the interior, but nothing
else.
Each of these Spanish maps were unpublished and available only to the Spanish Crown
and the Casa de Contratación, who jealously guarded all cartographic information about their
territories in the Americas. Maps were essential to imperial conquest and by restricting access to
this knowledge the Spanish Empire protected its sources of wealth from rival powers and
interlopers.81 The inherent biases of the Spanish Crown and the men who acted on its behalf over
time – namely a fixation on precious mineral extraction – relegated the production of knowledge
about island territories like Jamaica insignificant to their broader material goals.82 The very
existence of some of these maps were unknown outside of the halls of the Casa de Contratación,
like the Planisferio de Juan de la Cosa which was identified by a Dutch Ambassador visiting a
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Parisian bookshop in 1832.83 The embargo on Spanish maps of the Americas at a time when the
Spanish Empire was amassing obscene wealth from its exploitation of conquered lands
inadvertently created the conditions for a private European map trade to flourish. For Europeans,
cartographical knowledge was power and by the end of the sixteenth century markets had arisen
in bustling shipping hubs like London and Venice where private merchants side-stepped the
monopoly of the Casa de Contratación to produce maps of the Americas that could be purchased
by anyone with the capital to afford it.84
In terms of private maps, in 1507 German cartographer Martin Waldseemüller published
his Universalis Cosmographia, which was revolutionary in its representation of the Americas in
a separate hemisphere but did not advance knowledge of Jamaica or neighboring islands.85 The
Gerhard Mercator Orbis Imago of 1538 was novel in its use of “America” for both the northern
and southern continents while saying little about the islands of the Greater Antilles.86 For the
sixteenth century Spanish Empire, this meant an ever-expanding map of “discovered” lands to
which they already laid claim, but geographical or topographical details about these territories
were almost nonexistent. Islands did not capture the Spanish imaginary or inspire Conquistadors
like the seemingly boundless lands and riches of the American continents. Once the Spanish
Empire established possession of the coastlines of islands like Jamaica, investment was diverted
elsewhere, leaving the territory unmapped but claimed by Spain.
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In 1576, Italian writer and cartographer Thomaso Porcacchi published his L’isole piu
famose del mondo (The most famous island in the world) in Venice. This map pioneered a copper
engraving technique that allowed Porcacchi to depict the coastline and topography of Jamaica
more accurately. L’isole piu famose del mundo included multiple mountain ranges, a lake, and
several placenames across the island like Puerto Anton and Siviglia (Sevilla) on the northern
coast and Punta del Negrillo at the westernmost tip of Jamaica amongst others that – while not
always accurately located – did not appear on contemporary European maps [Figure 2.7].
Porcacchi’s map mistakenly situated the town of “Oristan” near the southern coast of the island

[Figure 2.7] Thomaso Porcacchi, L’isole piu famose del mondo, (Venice: Appresso Simon Galignani & Girolamo
Porro, 1576), University of Virginia Library.
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where the capital Villa de la Vega was established just decades prior and places “Guaigata” (later
translated by the English as “Wagwater”) and “Anton” (Port Antonio) on the far eastern coast of
the island due south of an island named “Melilla.” Although Melilla is believed to have been one
of the original settlements of Spanish Jamaica, the only island lying off the northeastern coast of
Jamaica is Navy Island, just off Port Antonio, which is just 64 acres and incapable of supporting
a settlement. Despite these inaccuracies, the placenames and topographical details included by
Porcacchi suggest that Spanish monopoly on cartographic knowledge of the Americas had been
broken. L’isole piu Famose del Mondo remained the most comprehensive map of Jamaica
available outside the confines of the Casa de Contratación until well into the seventeenth
century.
The Atlas Novus, created by Jacodus Hondius and published in Amsterdam in 1641,
contains the map of the Western Hemisphere America Noviter Delineata. This seventeenth
century Dutch work includes Jamaica but is almost an exact replica of Porcacchi’s earlier work.87
It was not until the English invaded the island in 1655 that newer and more accurate maps of
Jamaica were produced: the Spanish rushed to create maps in support of efforts to retain and then
retake the island, while the English quickly set about surveying and mapping the island for
settlement and plantation. Maps were tools through which Spain and England could wage interimperial warfare by creating and shaping knowledge of their conquests and possessions.
Exploitation of preexistent indigenous settlements, semi-agricultural crop fields,
fisheries, and fresh water sources were essential to how the Spanish chose the locations of their
colonial centers in Jamaica. The first permanent settlement, Sevilla la Nueva, was located nearby
what is today Santa Gloria, in the proximity of three known indigenous villages and was built
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within a year of Spanish conquest being formally declared. This began nearly a century and a
half of genocidal exploitation by the Spanish as they parasitically grafted the colonial settlements
onto indigenous geographies and networks. The Spanish saw land tenure and possession in semifeudal terms, of which the encomienda labor system was fundamental. As non-Catholics, the
indigenous were seen as heathens in the eyes of the allegedly devout Spanish Catholics and
indebted to the conquerors by nature of their conversion and salvation. By this rationale, the
indigenous owed service to the new masters of the island in the form of the encomienda. In the
part feudal, part agrarian capitalist construct of Spain at the turn of the sixteenth century, very
little land was cleared and converted into plantations or pastures for the purposes of agroindustrial production. The island’s haciendas of this period were consolidated in the hands of a
select few oligarchs and the only other agricultural operations on the island were intended to
provide victuals to conquistadors in search of mineral riches on Tierra Firme, luxury goods for
Spanish aristocrats, or small-scale export and sale in local, Caribbean markets.88
In the long term, genocidal exploitation and abuse by the Spanish, famine as the result of
an unraveling of indigenous networks of exchange, and European diseases decimated the
indigenous population of Jamaica.89 Those few who remained after the sixteenth century worked
and lived on the periphery of the colony or engaged in Marronage.90 The reconfiguration of
Jamaica in this physical sense contributed to the decimation of indigenous life and gave shape to
Spanish dominion. Situating Sevilla la Nueva alongside major indigenous villages like Maima
underscores the hyperexploitative interests of the Spanish. Within a couple decades, however,
the Spanish recognized that Sevilla la Nueva was unsuitable for long-term occupation for

Woodward, “Feudalism or Agrarian Capitalism?” 38-40.
Patrick Bryan, “Spanish Jamaica,” The Caribbean Quarterly 38, no. 2/3 (June-September 1992): 21-31.
90
Robertson, Gone is the Ancient Glory, 20-23.
88
89

43
Europeans given its humid, swampy climate that served as a breeding ground for mosquitoes and
tropical diseases. In 1519, Pedro Mazuelo, who was the colony’s treasurer at the time, requested
permission from the Crown to construct a second site on the southern side of the island that
would serve as an administrative center.
The Spanish Crown granted permission to resettle the capital in 1534. Mazuelo chose
Villa de la Vega with geographic centrality in mind, given its situation on the banks of the Rio
Cobre, which feeds into present-day Kingston Harbor. The site of Villa de la Vega also happened
to be at the nexus of multiple pre-Columbian trans-island trading paths used by the indigenous.91
Much like Sevilla la Nueva, Villa de la Vega also neighbored a major indigenous settlement,
which archaeological evidence suggests was one of the largest in Jamaica.92 The foundation,
relocation, and subsequent expansion of Spanish colonial spaces were based upon proximity to
readily exploitable resources. In the minds of the Spanish conquerors, this included the
enslavement of the indigenous and the exploitation of their labor and forms of subsistence. Semiagricultural fields, fishable coastlines, commodious harbors, navigable waterways, and
indigenous villages were all targeted by the Spanish colonists in a parasitic process of hyperexploitation of all that constituted indigenous life in Jamaica. Those who were not worked to
death by the Spanish either in Jamaica or elsewhere in the Spanish Americas fled the
encomienda and took refuge in the mountains of the island. This process of genocidal ethnic
cleansing was formalized by the construction of Spanish buildings in pre-existent indigenous
spaces, thereby rendering what had been indigenous geographies the domain of colonialism.
The diffuse and diverse collection of indigenous villages and settlements across the island
[Figure 1.9] was soon replaced by a succession of semi-urban colonial spaces that served
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[Figure 2.8] Map adapted from: Sabrina R. Rampersad, “Targeting the Jamaican Ostionoid: The Blue Marlin
Archaeological Project,” Caribbean Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2009): 30.

administrative and local agro-economic functions, in contrast to any broader mercantilist
interests.93 Based on the distribution of Redware found by archaeologists, there were significant
indigenous settlements nearby what is today Savanna la Mar, Bluefields, and Old Harbour on the
southeastern coast and St. Ann’s Bay on the northern coast. Bluefields is believed to be the
former location of the Spanish settlement of Oristan, while Old Harbour was Puerto Esquivel and
St. Ann’s Bay was the site of Sevilla la Nueva. Little changed in Spanish Jamaica over the
course of the century following the foundation of Villa de la Vega. Despite numerous incursions
by corsairs and privateers, the Spanish Jamaican colonists built little in the way of fortifications
and on several occasions Villa de la Vega was either overtaken or held ransom.94
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Unlike Sevilla la Nueva, the inland location of Villa de la Vega conformed to the Royal
Laws of the Indies, which were born of Spanish encounters with Barbary pirates in the vastly
different context of the Mediterranean but nevertheless enforced in the New World. For this
reason, the Spanish constructed the new colonial center with intra-island administrative
functionality, rather than with inter-island commerce or military strategy, in mind. This further
constrained the economic potential of Jamaica and left settlement and the functions of the colony
itself to the very few with the capital and desire to invest. Meanwhile, Spanish Jamaican colonial
oligarchs, especially the Columbus descendants, concerned themselves only with the few smallscale sugar estates on the island.95 The Spanish Crown and the colonial administration were so
unconcerned with the colony that Spanish maps of Jamaica even as late as 1656, despite having
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been a Spanish possession for more than a century, fail to portray with any real detail or accuracy
the topography or natural landscape of the island, or even the location of the colonial capital, in
stark contrast to maps of territories Nueva España [Figure 2.9].
2.4

Spanish Jamaican Realities
Piratical raids became a regular feature of life in Spanish Jamaica toward the end of the

sixteenth century.96 English corsairs were a particular nuisance to Spanish colonists, but the
danger they posed was material rather than mortal; plunder was the objective, not conquest. The
vecinos (residents) of the capital wrote the Real Audiencia often decrying the situation of the
colony and begging for support. “Take charge of bringing…one hundred and thirty laborers with
their wives and children,” one vecino wrote in 1585, “which is the most important thing for what
concerns the said city (Villa de la Vega) of this island (which) is in great danger from
corsairs…”97 The author reported that his own wife and child were leaving the island and that
there were undeveloped copper mines that he was left in charge of that he did not know how to
exploit.98 This desperate plea emphasizes how little concern the Casa de Contratación and the
Crown had for Jamaica. It also highlights a telling facet of Spanish Jamaican colonization by the
end of the sixteenth century: the vecinos of this era were not specialized or experienced in
colonial management, mining, agriculture, or anything that might have facilitated exploitation of
the natural resources of the island, nor were there regular regiments of soldiers to defend it. The

Don Fernando Melgarejo de Cordova, “The Spanish Version of Sir Anthony Shirley’s Raid of Jamaica, 1597,”
The Hispanic American History Review 5, no. 2 (May 1922): 227-248.
97
Vecino Pedro Lope Laso de la Vega to the Audiencia de Santo Domingo, 28 May 1585, ES.41091.AGI/25AGI,
folder 177, branch 4, Records of the Audiencia de Santo Domingo, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Spain.
98
In 1598, Governor Melgarejo de Córdova sent samples of copper to the Governor of Cartagena to determine
whether it should be mined. No location was provided for these mines, and nothing came of this research.
96

47
vecinos of the colony were often distant relatives of minor nobles and conquistadors who sought
the power and riches generations prior had attained in the New World.99
Spanish Jamaican colonists were ill-suited and poorly armed for life in the Greater
Antilles or in defense of the colony, but the faults were not all their own. The Casa de
Contratación and the Audiencia de Santo Domingo were both abundantly aware of the material
challenges confronting the vecinos and moradores (dwellers or commoners) and offered little
assistance. Despite repeated pleas for yearly trading vessels to supply the Jamaican market, ships
arrived inconsistently and sometimes years apart, and fortifications fell into disrepair from time
and use. By the turn of the seventeenth century, Spanish Jamaica had become a regular target of
pirates operating in the Caribbean. These pirates, often of English origin, would land on the
southern coast and pillage the dilapidated fortifications and houses on their path to the capital.
The colonial population, knowing the pirates would not pursue them and would instead hold the
town for ransom, fled inland upon their arrival rather than engaging the invading force. The
Spanish retreated to the woods beyond Villa de la Vega and waited to pay the pirates to vacate
the island. However, things did not always go so smoothly.
English Privateer Sir Anthony Shirley landed troops on the southern coast of Jamaica in
early 1597. The Spanish colonists fled, leaving behind their homes, churches, and any valuables
they could not convey into the woods. In their advance on the capital, Shirley’s raiding party was
frustrated by what they found: a derelict Spanish plaza lined with residences and containing little
more than a church and a butcher shop. These buildings had been stripped of anything of
material value before the vecinos retreated, leaving Shirley’s forces with nothing to plunder.
Enraged, the English set off into the woods in search of the colony’s governor and abbot, who
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shared authority over any ransom negotiations.100 The Spanish abbot Don Francisco Marques e
Villalobos eventually took refuge at a place named El Cayo de la Legua, while the governor
Francisco de Nabeda Albarado parlayed with the English in hopes of preventing any further
destruction. After brief negotiations, Albarado traveled to Marques e Villalobos and presented
the head Catholic figure of the colony with the English demands: 1,000 arrobas (Spanish unit of
measure roughly equivalent to 25 pounds) of meat and four hundred loads of cassava.101 The
governor sought the spiritual wisdom of the abbot as to whether fulfilling the ransom demands
violated their sacred covenant as Spanish Catholics. The abbot determined that they must deny
the English corsair, but not simply because of their duty to the Church: the colony did not
possess the requisite supply of either item. Infuriated at this denial, Shirley and his men laid
waste to Villa de la Vega and set off into the woods to search for the abbot. The raiding party
scoured the woods in vain before encountering an indigenous man named Pedro who willingly
offered his assistance in locating the Spaniards. Along the way, the English met another
indigenous man who also provided guidance. The motivations of these indigenous Jamaicans can
only be surmised, but these individuals were well-acquainted with Spanish colonialism and the
reign of terror enacted through the encomienda; a transition to English rule could not have been
worse for those enslaved and exploited by the oligarchs of Spanish Jamaica.
Led by these two men, Shirley quickly located the abbot at Cayo de la Legua, who fled at
a moment’s notice. The English looted this camp, giving the abbot time to make his way to the
nearby plantation Maimon, which the raiding party again found with ease thanks to their guides.
At this point, the secular Spanish authorities stepped in and relented to the English demands to
the extent that they could. Shirley and his men soon departed, leaving a path of destruction in
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their wake. Sir William Jackson attacked the Spanish Jamaican capital of Villa de la Vega again
in 1642, emulating the audacious example of the infamous Sir Francis Drake. Jackson gathered
nearly one thousand buccaneer recruits in St. Kitts and Barbados for the raid, landing five
hundred to advance on the capital. A sizeable contingent of vecinos resisted initially, killing 40
Englishmen in the process before being overrun.102 Before taking the colonial capital, Jackson
reported an encounter with Africans enslaved by the Spanish who informed him of their desire to
“change their old masters.”103 Jamaica was ultimately ransomed for 200 cattle, 10,000 pounds of
cassava bread, and 17,000 pieces of eight, leaving the island in an even more destitute state. In
both instances of pillaging by English corsairs, the majority of the vecinos of St. Jago de la Vega
fled with the belongings they could carry rather than risk their lives in a battle they were doomed
to lose.104 They sought the safety of the woods and Jamaica’s interior, hoping that their superior
knowledge of the densely wooded, mountainous interior would protect them from the marauding
Englishmen, because the Spanish Crown surely would not aid them in their defense. In this way,
they mirrored what some of the indigenous had done when they ran away to the mountains of
Jamaica once Spanish conquest formally began. Knowledge of Jamaica’s geography is therefore
essential to understanding resistance on the island against any external, overwhelming force.
Adherence to the Royal Laws of the Indies, along with absentee ownership by the
Columbus heirs until the end of the sixteenth century and a general lack of investiture in the
colonial infrastructure overall, constrained Spanish dominion and the ability to exercise authority
in Jamaica to the immediate vicinities of original capital Sevilla la Nueva and the relocated
capital at Villa de la Vega. Long before the arrival of the conquering forces under William Penn
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and Robert Venables in 1655, the Casa de Contratación and the Audiencia of Santo Domingo
had proven themselves unwilling to intervene in matters of governance, the economy, or the
military defenses of Jamaica.105 An appeal from Diego Aceves de Tapia in 1586, who had
married the granddaughter of a conquistador and was a minor noble, underscores the desperation
of vecinos in Spanish Jamaica: “I have served His Majesty on occasions of war with my person,
arms, horses and servants and at my expense…(for) more than sixteen years…(in) the said island
of Jamaica…I suffer greatly and my wife and my children…we cannot support ourselves.”106
There was no denying that, even for the wealthiest and most connected of vecinos, life in
Spanish Jamaica by the turn of the seventeenth century had become untenable. The colony was
reduced to a single settlement, leaving much of the island without any discernible Spanish
presence. In the vacuums of authority across the island – meaning those spaces within Spanish
Jamaican jurisdiction that maps did not define – enslaved, free, and Maroon communities formed
by the indigenous and afrodescendientes articulated social forms and subsistence pathways that
relied upon traditional communalism.
Very early in the conquest of Jamaica, some indigenous caciques openly resisted and
entire communities fled enslavement. Rebels retreated and fortified themselves in the
mountainous and seemingly impassable spaces of the island interior. When the Spanish began
killing the caciques of Jamaica, many indigenous Jamaicans submitted in despair, while others
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remained in the mountains long after.107 Decades later, small communities of enslaved and freed
African and afrodescendiente men and women who had been imported to supplement the
dwindling indigenous population took root on the physical periphery of the colony’s capital and
were an essential laboring force for the vecinos of the island. These populations existed in a
liminal space in which they had attained legal freedom, but nevertheless lived at the discretion of
the colony. In 1596, Governor Fernando de Melgarejo created a formal company of troops that
included the indigenous and afrodescendientes, while in December of 1597 vecinos refused a call
from Governor Fernando de Melgarejo to create a settlement for the remaining indigenous on the
island, arguing that it would have left the hatos without laborers.108 In 1601, Governor Melgarejo
wrote that he had commissioned an expedition – supposedly paid for with his own funds – into
the Blue Mountains to subdue and enslave indigenous rebels.109 Nothing ever came of the
slaving expedition and the rebels ostensibly continued to live in isolation in the mountains. The
Spanish themselves regularly made use of the woods and interior of the island as refuge from
piracy. The legacy of this space left unsettled and unrectified by the Spanish offered a landscape
devoid of colonial settlement in which subjugated communities maintained and outlined rival
geographies of freedom.
Under the aegis of Spanish colonialism, runaways who engaged in resistance through the
process we now understand as Marronage removed themselves entirely from the limited – both
in scale and size – system of hatos, sugar plantations, provision fields, and ports that constituted
the entirety of the food pathways and commerce of that era. Simply put, there was ample space
and cause for indigenous peoples to distance themselves from the colony and engage in
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subsistence. We know this because of the repeated piratical raids of Villa de la Vega, which by
the seventeenth century was the only remaining occupied Spanish settlement, which were always
conducted to reap cassava and meat rather than material goods. The few riches to be had were
personal trinkets and the colonists possessed almost no ability to defend themselves from
attack.110 Given that the indigenous had no use whatsoever for personal valuables of the vecinos
– value here is entirely dependent on the Western, European capitalist notion – and the Spanish
had almost nothing in the way of tools or goods that would have benefited life in Marronage (the
Spanish were entirely dependent on indigenous food pathways and agriculture), the decision to
retreat to the Blue Mountains and live a life of subsistence in solitude was rational and based on
the material realities of Jamaica.
What can only be glimpsed through archival and oral histories was the confluence of
runaways, both African and indigenous, in the mountainous interior of Jamaica prior to the
arrival of the English. We can, however, be sure that such kinship bonds were formed in this
period based on mitochondrial DNA research conducted on Accompong Maroons that proves
their indigenous lineage.111 Long before the English invaded and forced the inhabitants of
Spanish Jamaica to flee, the forebearers of populations that we came to know as the Jamaican
Maroons articulated the ecologies and rival geographies of resistance that became fundamental to
their prolonged opposition to either European occupier. However, the full lineage that
contributed to what we know of today as Jamaican Marronage is incomplete without
incorporating the traditions of the West African populations that were enslaved and transported
across the Atlantic to Jamaica.
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Both the form and function of Spanish colonization of Jamaica were determined by
imperial standards established during the Reconquista (reconquest of Spain from Moorish rule
that preceded the voyages of Columbus). The encomienda system was enacted as a means of
extracting labor from Muslims occupying reconquered territories, the physical shape and location
of the colonial capital were based on settlement experiences in the Mediterranean, and the social
and political hierarchies were imported from Spain and adapted to the Americas. Capital
investment and colonial authority were concentrated in centralized, urban capitals surrounded by
vast, undeveloped, and essentially unincorporated forests, mountains, and valleys. According to
one of the final maps commissioned by the Spanish during the last year of its possession of
Jamaica, the mapmaker still errantly positioned Villa de la Vega as the geographic center of the
island.112 Spanish maps of Jamaica did not depict the impassability of the island interior and
instead featured large stretches of blank, indistinguishable space in place of the island’s notable
savannahs, cockpits, and mountain ranges.113 These places possessed no utility for a Spanish
empire hellbent on extracting every bit of gold, silver, and other precious metals from every
possible vein the Americas offered. Jamaica simply did not present the kind of opportunity
sought by the Crown. Maps yet again offer remarkable utility as insights into imperial
perceptions, such that the cartographic oversights highlight the relative unimportance of Jamaica
in comparison to the mainland or even to nearby Cuba and Hispaniola.
Spanish imperial strategies related to the rectification and definition of space became
more unmistakable after conquest of the island by the English, who made it a foremost priority to
establish coastal fortifications for protection against piratical attacks or invasion, pacify hostile
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elements within the island, and to develop the agricultural and commercial infrastructures.114 The
proliferation of commissioned maps of the Americas across the sixteenth- and seventeenthcenturies, which emphasize sites possessing vast mineral wealth, like Potosí, or those that were
the targets of large scale imperial conquest, like Perú, neither of which describe Jamaica,
underscores the Spanish preoccupation with Tierra Firme.115 In turn, the realities represented by
these maps demonstrate the historical process by which the Spanish Empire unwittingly fostered
the liminal spaces in which Marronage flourished. The Spanish colonies of the Caribbean in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were frontier zones of interaction under constant threat of
invasion from without and reprisal from within. In the borderlands of Empire, the colonial agents
of the Crown engaged in ongoing processes of negotiation with rival empires, native and Maroon
populations, and the realities of the American landscape.116 Commissioned surveys and maps of
the colonial territories recorded and standardized subjective and momentary perceptions of the
New World. Setting these maps in contrast to those commissioned within the initial fifty years
post-English conquest emphasizes the dissonance between these rival imperial approaches to
incorporating and managing the same places and spaces. This juxtaposition alongside a deeper
analysis of the maps and surveys of Jamaica produced under English colonialism provide a
blueprint for the evolving geographies of resistance inherited by the island’s Maroons.
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3

MAKING JAMAICA ENGLISH – FROM CONQUEST TO COLONIAL
FOUNDATIONS

In the heat of the mid-afternoon on May 9, 1655, two fishermen hunting the coastal
waters of Jamaica for turtles spotted a fleet of ships rounding Morant Point on the eastern end of
the island.117 Without delay, the pair set off in their canoes to warn the population of Santiago de
la Vega (St. Jago de la Vega). Spanish reconnaissance quickly identified the ships as English as
they entered Caguaya Bay and dropped anchor. After a brief volley from a Spanish battery on the
shore, the detachment of Spaniards fled inland and allowed the English soldiers to make landfall
unopposed. Soon thereafter, the vecinos and moradores of Villa de la Vega, the capital of the
colony, abandoned their homes, stores, and ecclesiastical buildings, taking with them only what
they could carry.118 From the woods on the outskirts of the capital, the Spanish colonists offered
a truce to the English, mistaking the intentions of the invading force based on their prior
interactions with privateers like William Jackson and Anthony Shirley. It quickly became clear
that the invaders, under the fraught leadership of Robert Venables and William Penn, had no
intention of merely plundering and moving on from Jamaica; they intended to take the island and
make it English by force.
Escape from the English invasion necessitated a treacherous hike through the unsettled,
nearly impassable mountainous interior to reach the northern coast for rescue. The Spanish
vecinos, moradores, and free and enslaved Africans and indigenous people of Jamaica took to
these spaces beyond the geographies of Spanish colonialism to use the protection afforded by the
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natural landscape against the English invaders. A strategic retreat into the mountainous interior
of the island was precisely what the indigenous people had done when the Spanish invaded in the
early sixteenth century and what the colonists had done for decades prior when under assault
from privateers.119 Meanwhile, the beleaguered and exhausted English troops, still reeling from
their unsuccessful attempt to conquer Santo Domingo, swept into the capital of Villa de la Vega
and secured it without firing a single shot and raided what little remained after the inhabitants
fled. For decades prior, the vecinos of Spanish Jamaica warned the Crown and colonial
administration of the threat of English conquest and for decades the Spanish Crown refused to
take decisive action. The arrival of the English and the Western Design had begun what the
vecinos of the Spanish colony long feared: the loss of Jamaica to a European rival.120
3.1

Sowing the Seeds of Conquest: England in the Seventeenth Century
The period between the late sixteenth and mid-seventeenth century was a time of

tremendous, but gradual, change in English society. The Tudor regents of this era presided over a
series of parallel political and religious “reformations” that severed ties with Catholic Rome,
birthed the bureaucratic state, and reshaped the very nature of English religiosity – all to varying
degrees across time and space.121 These changes were the product of collaborations between the
Tudor state and the subjects it governed. At the same time, the English economy was also being
transformed by far more top-down processes like the enclosure movement, disafforestation,
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cutbacks in royal households, and the growing power of new merchants in London.122 These
concurrent transformations led to the creation of a landless, “masterless,” and thereby transient
class of impoverished laborers and the creation of stark cultural divisions. This displaced
population migrated in large numbers to London, where men sought work in clothmaking and
metalworking, or later in soldiering as part of the New Model Army created in the 1640s.123
England enjoyed dominance over the textile trade in northern Europe throughout the sixteenth
century thanks to the power of the Merchant Adventurers in London, but the emergence of “new
merchants” at the end of the century began to transform the English economy. These new
merchants of London established the Levant Company in 1592 and the East India Company in
1600, which were focused on imports from the Ottoman Empire, India, and the islands of
Southeast Asia. By the 1640s, this rising class of new merchants constituted the core of
London’s merchant leadership.124
The Merchant Adventurers brought about their own demise with their rejection of
overseas trade and thereby left the exploitation of the Americas and Asia to the new merchants.
The transformation of the English economy augmented the political power of these newcomers,
like the merchants of the Levant and East India Companies, as the Crown became increasingly
reliant on taxes on trade to finance the monarchy. For their part, the new merchants depended on
royal licenses for their monopolies. Despite the general working relationship between Crown and
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merchants, however, there were tense periods of opposition to King Charles I in the early
seventeenth century, during which period he ruled without calling or consulting Parliament.125
During the 1630s, some prominent new merchants rapidly developed sugar plantations in
Caribbean colonies. In response to the 1641 Spanish conquest of Providence Island, new
merchants in league with the 2nd Earl of Warwick, Robert Rich – who was a major factor in the
colonization project off the coast of Tierra Firme – commissioned Captain William Jackson to
raid a series of Spanish colonies in the Caribbean between 1642-1645, including Jamaica.126 This
connection to Jamaica later proved influential when a close acquaintance of the Earl of Warwick,
Oliver Cromwell, rose through the ranks to lead the New Model Army.
Tensions between King Charles I and the English Parliament, which featured prominent
Puritan voices like John Pym, continued to build into the 1640s. The king further enraged his
religious opposition with the appointment of William Laud as Archbishop of Canterbury, who
reintroduced some of the more ceremonial aspects of Christianity that had been associated with
Catholicism in England.127 His gravest transgression, however, came in 1637 when – to enforce
liturgical uniformity – he instituted the Book of Common Prayer throughout all of Britain.128 The
majority Presbyterian Scottish revolted and in February of 1638 drafted the National Covenant,
which banned the book and expelled the bishops who were seen as extensions of royal authority.
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This necessitated a response by King Charles I against those who signed the document, known as
Covenanters, and led to the Bishops’ Wars of 1639-1640.129
Portions of the English population, especially Puritans, likewise resented the Laudian
religious reforms and provided material support to the Scottish. When Charles I realized that he
could not fund the English war effort through royal authority, he reluctantly called the Short
Parliament with Pym, who had served as treasurer of the Providence Island Company from 16301639, leading the radical Puritan opposition. The failure of the English forces in the Bishops’
Wars was compounded by the obstinate refusal of Parliament to provide the funding requested
by Charles I. Tensions between the Puritan opposition led by Pym and others later manifested as
concrete demands in the text of the Great Remonstrance in 1641. This document outlined a host
of parliamentary prerogatives and detailed plans for an anti-Spanish campaign of conquest in the
Caribbean.130 When Charles I attempted to have Pym and four additional members of Parliament
arrested in January 1642, it ignited the events known as The English Civil War.
Parliamentarian forces created a standing army in 1645 to buttress the flagging war
effort.131 The New Model Army was born out of three smaller armies led by veteran Puritan
officers who had risen through the ranks in the three years of preceding warfare and imbued their
command with a certain religious zeal, including General Oliver Cromwell. The common
soldiery was drawn from the transient population that had been displaced over the preceding
decades by the enclosure movement, disafforestation, and the reduction in households. This
meant that much of the officer class of the New Model Army were zealous Puritans who opposed
the religious leanings of King Charles I and supported a constitutional monarchy, while the
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soldiers themselves tended to hold far more radical political views.132 Initial hostilities ended in
1646 when the king surrendered, but a second wave of fighting initiated by royalists in 1648 led
to calls from the more radical wing of the New Model Army, as well as revolutionaries who
hoped to institute sweeping changes to the constitution, to execute Charles I.133 The execution of
King Charles I in 1649 upturned English society, if only for a brief period, and parliamentarians
quickly declared England a Commonwealth.134
The Rump Parliament governed England between 1649-1653, during which time Oliver
Cromwell as head of the New Model Army conquered Ireland and Scotland.135 In 1653,
Cromwell forcibly dissolved parliament and was named Lord Protector of England. A devout
Puritan, Cromwell was vehemently opposed to Catholic Spain and anything even tangentially
“papist” in nature. His connections to the Providence Island Company and other Puritan colonies
in the Americas, the intentions outlined by parliamentarians in The Grand Remonstrance, and the
new merchant power in London propelled the English to action against the Spanish in the
Americas. In 1654, following a four-year build-up in naval forces, Lord Protector Oliver
Cromwell launched an audacious plan to conquer Spanish territories in the Caribbean known as
the Western Design.136
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3.2

The Western Design: Making Jamaica English
Under the Western Design, the English intended to capture Hispaniola, Cartagena, or

Cuba, the latter two of which were vital nodes of the Spanish flota routes.137 Hispaniola, the
chosen target, was fundamental to Spanish imperial governance over its many colonies in the
New World and was both the political and ecclesiastical seat of power in the Spanish
Americas.138 Cromwell’s closest advisors, like the Anglican-converted priest Thomas Gage who
in 1648 authored, sensationalized, and plagiarized tales of his journeys as a priest throughout the
Spanish Americas in A New Survey of the West India’s: Or, The English American his Travail by
Sea and Land, were keenly familiar with the many successes of privateers from previous
decades.139 Raids of Jamaica and other Spanish Caribbean territories by Francis Drake, Anthony
Shirley, and William Jackson – who was commissioned for his raids and outfitted by prominent
new merchants involved in the Providence Island Company from 1638-1641 and 1642-1645 –
provided ample evidence that the Spanish territories were ripe for the taking.140 The Western
Design satisfied the long-held desire for retribution for those involved with Providence Island
and was a firm rebuke of the power of the Catholic Church.141
The Western Design fleet consisted of 38 vessels and launched from Portsmouth on
orders from admiralty commissioner and general-at-sea John Disbrowe (or Desborough) on
December 25, 1654, carrying an estimated 2,500 troops, only about 1,000 of which were trained
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soldiers.142 The fleet sailed under the command of William Penn and Robert Venables, the latter
who earned Cromwell’s respect as a commander during the conquest of Ireland, while the troops
were divided into five regiments under five commanders that ultimately answered to Venables.
The Western Design was fraught from the outset, in part because of its confusing leadership
structure and a woeful lack of food and water for troops. Despite being the first state-backed,
launched, financed, and managed attempt to strike at the core of the Spanish Americas, these
structural and material failures doomed the campaign to take Santo Domingo.143
Issues with the invasion of Santo Domingo included the landing of soldiers miles away
from the intended location, fierce resistance from Maroons, and clumsy and ineffective advances
on the colony’s defenses combined to undermine the invading force, leaving them defeated and
exhausted. Venables later related his frustrations with the Western Design in The Narrative of
General Venables in which he defended his actions as commander of the land forces and
emphasized the restrictions of the chosen landing spot along with a lack of food and supplies for
the troops.144 Major Robert Sedgwick, who arrived at Santo Domingo with reinforcements
shortly after the forces had fled, blamed the defeat on divine wrath and God’s indisputable
disapproval of the campaign. In truth, blame for the failure of the Western Design can be shared
by all who planned, organized, oversaw, and carried out the project, from Cromwell and
Disbrowe to William Penn, Venables, the field commanders, and the soldiers who routinely fled
upon engagement with the Spanish. Cromwell, Disbrowe, and other prominent Puritan
supporters of the Western Design believed that divine provenance was on the side of the English
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and would see their forces to victory over the Catholic Spaniards. Penn, Venables, and the
commanders disembarked their troops ill-equipped and failed to maintain discipline. During their
exhausting 25-mile march from the point of disembarkation to the city of Santo Domingo, the
English troops were routed repeatedly by the Spanish, enslaved Africans, and the Maroons of
Hispaniola.145 By the time Venables and the other commanders determined to return to the ships,
an estimated 1,000 English troops had been lost.
The English left Santo Domingo defeated, exhausted, and disillusioned. The Western
Design was a failure and Penn and Venables had two options: they could return to England with
their tails between their legs and beg forgiveness or they could attempt to salvage the campaign
by setting their sights elsewhere in the Spanish Americas. They chose the latter. The closest
colonies were Cuba and Jamaica, two very different propositions: Cuba was well-fortified since
it was a major entrepot on the Spanish flota routes, whereas Jamaica possessed almost no
fortifications and had been successfully raided and captured by William Jackson just the decade
prior. In short order Penn and Venables decided to invade Jamaica.
By the 1650s Spanish Jamaica was a colony with only one town, sparse agricultural
fields, and hatos restricted to the southern coastline and plains only miles inland.146 These sites
were colonized because the indigenous had, for hundreds of years prior, made use of these same
locations for their own exploitation of the island’s natural resources. However, while the
indigenous may have sown conucos and hunted mammals for subsistence, the Spanish grew
crops like sugar and coffee on the haciendas of oligarchs for luxury consumption in Spain and
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introduced herds of cattle and hogs that transformed the natural landscape.147 Both the
indigenous and Spanish colonial populations relied on native plants like cassava to survive, but
the Spaniards brought with them a system of labor and land tenure that mimicked the process of
re-feudalism applied by Spanish aristocrats in reconquered Moorish territories in the Iberian
Peninsula.148 The repartimiento, encomienda, and the ecclesiastical structures borne out of the
Reconquista left permanent marks on Jamaica that, rather than being destroyed, were the very
foundation for English colonization.149
Indigenous geographies based on patterns of settlement, exchange, and subsistence were
coopted by the Spanish for the benefit of oligarchs, which laid the groundwork for an English

[Figure 3.1] Edmund Hickeringill, Jamaica Viewed, No Scale, (London: John Williams, 1661).
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colony founded by Puritans and private capital and developed on the logics of land enclosure and
mercantilism.150 Each step in this historical process shaped Jamaica for exploitation based on an
imperialist cultural understanding of the relationship between the individual, society, and the
natural environment. Edmund Hickeringill created Jamaica Viewed in 1661 as the first attempt to
map the island since the English invasion arrived in 1655 [Figure 3.1]. Hickeringill did not
attempt to depict topography, but his exhaustive detailing of the coastlines demonstrates an
advancement in mapping techniques from earlier Spanish cartography.
Indigenous approaches to land tenure came to represent an alternative model to the
imported hyperexploitative methods of the Spanish and English. The indigenous Jamaicans and
the Maroons first confronted the part-feudal and part-mercantilist Spanish colonial system
dominated by the interests of a few oligarchs and then later English mercantilism brought by the
Western Design. However, the “rival geographies” articulated by Maroon communities, along
with the contingent ecological practices therein, shaped the world around them just as they were
shaped by it.151 Camp adapts the idea of the “rival geography” as set forth by Edward Said to
include, “alternative ways of knowing and using plantation and southern space that conflicted
with planters’ ideals and demands.” I employ “rival geography” here to encompass the many
natural landscapes that constituted Jamaican Marronage in this period, which included provision
grounds, hunting grounds, housing, coastal salt harvesting locations, places of ritual, and
networks of communication and exchange.
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Analyzing historical maps alongside manuscript colonial records highlights the
competing geographies of English imperialism and Maroon resistance. The distinct landscapes of
each represent dramatically different understandings of the relationship between the individual,
society, and nature. The movement of people and goods within and across these spaces
established a geographic narrative of imperialism and anti-imperialism that allows us to rethink
the chronology of colonialism in Jamaica.
After the English defeated and ousted the Spanish, all land in Jamaica became property of
the English Crown. To distribute land to settlers, accurate surveys of the natural landscape
needed to be conducted. Surveyors could then isolate parcels of arable land that could be
distributed by the colony through grants to settlers known as Letters Patent. Landholders would
then be required to pay an annual quitrent.152 As a result, surveys and maps became paramount to
the plans of Jamaican planters as the method for parceling and then deeding the land for
settlement.153 There was a burgeoning demand for land from planters who arrived from nearby
island colonies in these early years: an estimated 12,000 English men came to Jamaica in the first
six years after the initial invasion. However, as a result of disease and famine due to a lack of
agriculture, a census conducted in 1661 found there were only 2,458 “white men” residing in
Jamaica of whom most were not planters.154 The English first hunted wild cattle and hogs to feed
the colonial population but then quickly relied on tamed livestock. They organized the economy
around a variety of cash crops like indigo, cocoa, cotton, tobacco, and sugar to create a viable
trade in those raw goods to turn a profit.155 English mercantilist practices and the capitalist logic
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that evolved from these economic foundations informed how the colony of Jamaica expanded.
King Charles II and his colonial administrators prioritized surveying, parceling, and
commoditizing all land possible, and settlement was incentivized in myriad ways. At the most
fundamental level, mercantilism necessitated the constant acquisition and exploitation of new
territories and un-, or under-, tapped natural resources to perpetuate the most positive export to
import ratio possible. Profits under capitalism were ensured by the monopolization and
hyperexploitation of natural resources and enslaved labor in increasingly efficient manners. By
possessing sole control over the supply of a resource and minimizing cost outlays for labor,
wealthy plantation owners and investors generated economic wealth. However, to achieve
maximum profits within the framework of mid-seventeenth century English mercantilism
necessitated control over the entirety of the landmass of Jamaica.
In the case of English Jamaica, Englishmen like Oliver Cromwell, Robert Rich, John
Desbrowe, and Thomas Gage declared that their inspiration for the Western Design was divine
providence.156 They believed themselves ordained by God to repossess the Spanish Americas
from their Catholic enemies. When the Western Design failed in its embarrassing fashion at
Santo Domingo, the operation was stripped of this divine motivation and the underlying
economic purposes of this imperial conquest were laid bare. Throughout the latter half of the
seventeenth century, the English colony of Jamaica began, with fits and starts, its inexorable
expansion in the pursuit of arable land for the purposes of capitalist exploitation. This totalizing
mindset drove the English into violent conflict with Jamaica’s Maroons and it did not take long
for these tensions to surface.
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3.3

Marronage and the English Conquest of Jamaica
The English may have faced little discernible armed resistance in the taking of St. Jago de

la Vega, but that did not mean the conquest of Jamaica was without English casualties. In the
early weeks of 1656, Vice Admiral William Goodson, who had taken over command of the
English forces at Jamaica when General Venables and Admiral Penn returned to London to
defend themselves against their detractors, wrote to the Naval Commissioners that the Spanish of
the island were in a sickly state and that, “they dare not resist 50 English,” but continued that,
“when the negroes found any English straggling in the woods they butchered them with
lances.”157 Months later, Captain William Godfrey wrote to Robert Blackborne, Secretary of the
Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, “Most of the Spaniards have deserted the Island…now
and then we receive opposition from the negroes and mulattoes who slew about 40 of our
soldiers about a month since.”158 Mere weeks thereafter, Captain Mark Harrison reported in
April 1656 that, “A party of soldiers lately fell upon some negroes as they were in Council and
killed eight, the rest excaping [sic] save one woman, which is the first service they have done
upon the enemy since his arrival, and it is supposed they were the negroes who killed so many of
our men.”159 In just under four months, scores of English soldiers and at least eight Maroons
were killed in raids. Despite this constant threat, the invaders had almost no intelligence about
the Maroons.
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The English came to Jamaica as a last resort, a means to salvage the reputation of those
behind the Western Design. They arrived with only the knowledge imparted by privateers who
had raided the island in decades past, which meant that the English arrived knowing only the
settlements of Spanish Jamaica. The English knew little about the natural landscape and even
less about those who had taken up residence in its densely wooded and mountainous interior in
“palenques,” a Spanish term for a fortified, defensive settlement. Early maps of Jamaica, like
Richard Blome’s 1671 A New & Exact Mapp of ye isle of Jamaica, demonstrate how English
settlement in the seventeenth century relied heavily on the areas previously settled by the
Spanish [Figure 3.2]. St. Jago, St. Ann’s Bay, and the lands bordering Old Harbour were all sites
of Spanish occupation that became early estates and plantations of English Jamaica. The interior
of the island was depicted as mountainous and densely wooded, but with few other features.
In these early years of Jamaican conquest, the English and the Maroons mainly interacted
in skirmishes and ambushes staged by the various palenques. One exception came in 1657 when
Vice Admiral William Goodson ordered Captain Campoe Sabada – a Jewish pilot who was
familiar with the island from his service under the command of Captain Jackson – and a
detachment of troops to disembark at Point Pedro in search of the Spanish.160 There they landed

“Capt. Sabada’s Journal,” in A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 4, Sept 1655 - May 1656,
ed. Thomas Birch (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 535-548; [Figure 3.2] “Poynt Pedro” is found on the southern
coastline of Jamaica on Blome’s map due east of “S. Iago”. While this specific placename is no longer used, the
name “Pedro” still appears on local streets and buildings around Great Pedro’s Bluff, which lies on the southern
coast in St. Elizabeth’s Parish.
160

70

[Figure 3.2] Richard Blome, A New & Exact Mapp of ye Isle of Jamaica, No Scale, (London: H. Clark, 1671).

and set off in search of the Spanish at the small settlement named Paretty. When the group made
camp at nightfall, they encountered a pair of Maroons on horseback who issued a warning to the
English,
a negro came on horseback demanding what we came for, for victuals? answer
was no, but to seek out the Spaniards in those parts; his, that they had no more to
do with the Spaniards than with us, and if we came to kill them, they would kill
our men when they pleased. Being asked what they did there? they did intend to
live there so long as there was any cattle to kill.161

“Capt. Sabada’s Journal,” in A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Volume 4, Sept 1655 - May 1656,
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This interaction sheds light on the differing conceptions of land tenure and possession at play
between the two groups. The Maroons make clear that they would “live there so long as there
was any cattle to kill,” meaning that they did not lay claim to the land as privately held property
in perpetuity, but instead contended that the community possessed exclusive rights to hunt the
wild cattle that roamed the region. This framework of land tenure was a common feature of
customary, pre-colonial West African practices (especially in the plains and savannahs), where
the boundaries of communities or even kingdoms were intimately tied to rights of first
possession and to natural resources, like exclusive hunting rights.162 The two groups were
working off disparate assumptions. The English were bent on conquest of Jamaica from the
Spanish and establishing dominion over the entirety of the landmass. Meanwhile the Maroons
continued to exist and subsist in the manners to which they had grown accustomed under the
aegis of Spanish imperialism and following traditions that originated in their pre-colonial West
African homelands. The English pursued a strategic military goal to complete their conquest of
Jamaica; the Maroons reiterated their claims to specific parts of the island based on their firstcomer status and hunting rights. This exchange did not lead to violence between the two parties,
but briefly revealed the foundations of these incompatible social conceptualizations of land
tenure.
Previous encounters with African and indigenous populations during raids of Spanish
Jamaica had imparted the English with the belief that they would welcome new “masters.” Those
who had raided the Spanish colony with William Jackson reported as much and the stories told
by Thomas Gage reiterated these lessons. Instead, English encounters with these populations

162

Carol Lentz, Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 127128. Spirituality and earth-shrines were vitally important to these claims in the context of West Africa as well and
would become so for the Maroons as they established and defined their permanent settlements.

72
during the conquest of Jamaica were violent and unrelenting. As conquest progressed, the
Maroons continued to forcefully defend land they claimed and eventually distanced themselves
from the Spanish and carved out a middle ground between the two colonizers, intentionally or
not. Captain Sabada and his troops heeded the threats and did not pursue these individuals.
Shortly after this encounter, the English contingent captured two Spanish scouts who had been
trailing them and discovered that the insurgents were awaiting supplies and reinforcements from
Cartagena. The original goal of the Western Design was not only to displace the Spanish from
their territory, but also to settle and plant as much of the land as possible for cash crop
production, just as it had been with the Providence Island Company. Those aspirations could not
be pursued, however, until the island was under English dominion. The battle for the capital at
St. Jago de la Vega may have been settled without bloodshed, but the conquest of Jamaica was
yet to be completed.
The English quickly established themselves in St. Jago de la Vega and began
transforming the buildings of the Spanish colonial capital; the Catholic church was destroyed, a
former hermitage was converted into a sheep pen, and older buildings were stripped and used as
fuel.163 While this took place, the Spanish split into two camps: the majority of the vecinos fled
to Cuba – some with their enslaved domestic servants – while the moradores and those vecinos
born in Jamaica regrouped on the northern side of the island. The African and African-descended
population of Spanish Jamaica, as far as we know from the available sources, formed three
prominent, independent communities. There was the palenque of Juan de Bolas in the hills
between Lluidas Vale and Guanaboa Vale in St. Catherine’s Parish, which from all indications
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[Figure 3.3] John Ogilby, Novissima et Accuratissima Jamaicae Descriptio, No Scale, (London: Frank Lamb,
1671).

included “negros horros” (freedmen) and individuals who had been enslaved on Spanish
Jamaican haciendas. On John Ogilby’s Novissima et Accuratissima Insulae Jamaica Descriptio,
based on a survey conducted by John Man from 1661-1670, this palenque is officially listed as
part of the colony in far southwestern “St. Annes” [Figure 3.3]. By 1660, this group had allied
with the English against the Spanish and were later integrated into the colonial forces. A
community established in a region known as “Los Vermejales” was led by Juan de Serras and
located in northern Clarendon Parish near what is today James Hill and appears to have been
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largely composed of former hunters and ranchers.164 This palenque was not included on Obilgy’s
map or any other map of English Jamaica, likely because the colonists never knew its precise
location and by 1670 the community had relocated. The English believed this group to be so
closely aligned with the Spanish as to take orders directly from the acting leader of the Spanish
resistance, Cristobal Arnaldo Ysassi.165 There was a third group that is believed to have settled
near the Mocho Mountains in western Clarendon Parish, but little evidence remains of this
community.166 On Ogilby’s map, this palenque would have been found in the “Unnamed”
precinct that lay south of St. James and St. Annes. These palenques consisted of sharpened pikes
that surrounded a strategic location. Syncretic cultures and dynamic social configurations based
upon African and indigenous practices and traditions took root within these spaces and formed
the foundation of what we now know as Jamaican Marronage. The Spanish and this trio of
Maroon palenques – sometimes in tandem, but more often not – raided the invaders at St. Jago
de la Vega and often destroyed plantations throughout the island in these initial years, killing and
kidnapping English soldiers and stealing weapons and tools.
The English had no clue how to capture the Maroons or root out the Spanish insurgents,
in part because they were more preoccupied with securing the coastlines from an invasion from
the sea than the island’s interior. On one occasion the insurgents attacked the English-occupied
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[Figure 3.4] Francisco Fernandez de la Cueva, Croquis de la bahía y puerto de Jamaica con sus fortificaciones, No
Scale, 1658, Maps and Plans – Santo Domingo, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO,
57BIS.

capital in three separate locations on a single day, burning down strategic buildings in the town
square and gathering intelligence on the English defenses in the port to communicate to the
Spanish Crown [Figure 3.4].167 In 1658, Croquis de la bahía y puerto de Jamaica con sus
fortificaciones was created and conveyed to the Audiencia de Santo Domingo. This sketch
details the main English housing and fortifications along the coast of what the English called
“Port Royal Harbor.” The creator of this map included the locations of rivers, channels, and
landings that would have been useful in the event of a reconquest by the Spanish.
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Ysassi capably led the Spanish in this guerrilla warfare in these first two years of English
occupation despite his limitations as a military commander. The Spanish resistance established
camps on the northern coast of the island near former settlements like Sevilla la Nueva and used
Los Vermejales as a staging ground for periodic raids on the occupied capital. The Spanish
forestalled attempts by planters to settle south, west, or north of St. Jago de la Vega while the
beleaguered English soldiers succumbed to any number of ailments at an alarming rate [Figure
3.5].168 The Maroons “frequently killed stragglers” near St. Jago de la Vega and even set fire to a
building in town. These attacks continued unabated for the greater part of two years and many,
including Major-General Robert Sedgwick in 1656, believed that the Maroons would “prove as
thorns and pricks in our sides.” Just months later a Maroon ambush killed forty soldiers
meandering about outside town.169 In August of 1657, Ysassi’s troops routed an English

[Figure 3.5] Map of Spanish, English, and Maroon Positions during English conquest (1655-1658). English planters
settled Morant Point soon after the initial invasion, but the English land forces remained confined to St. Jago de la
Vega for the first two years of conquest.
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squadron and overran them entirely in the Guatibacoa region.170 This guerrilla warfare eventually
forced the English to adjust their strategic approach to pacifying the island. A stockade was built
in the capital, complete with three cannons, and fortifications were constructed on the north and
south sides of the garrisoned town to cover any approaches.171
The Spanish received reinforcements and supplies arrived at the northern shores of
Jamaica but under great delay and in bits and pieces from Cuba.172 Some of the troops that
arrived from Cuba, however, were more of a hinderance than help and most of the funds
assigned for Jamaica never reached Ysassi.173 The Spanish advanced from Los Vermejales and
routed an English troop detachment stationed in Old Harbour [Figure 3.5].174 Meanwhile,
English efforts to import planters and induce soldiers to settle and plant land near St. Jago and
Morant Point began to pay dividends. By July 1657, an English regiment under Colonel Francis
Barrington had developed a plantation so productive that Lieutenant-Colonel William Brayne
expressed hopes that the Jamaican population could become self-sufficient, “within a short
time.”175 When Edward D’Oyley resumed command of all English land and sea forces in
September of 1657 he emphasized the use of cavalry forces against the Spanish insurgents to
great success, decimating the troops loyal to Ysassi. The Spanish regiment stationed nearer the
northern coast in the region of Santa Ana, known as St. Ann’s Bay to the English, made very
little progress in the building of fortifications and some even began to desert.176 By the end of the
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year, the Maroons likely posed a greater threat to English conquest of Jamaica than the
Spaniards.
The decisive battle in the Spanish effort to forestall the English conquest of Jamaica came
in July 1658. The commander of the English forces in Jamaica, Edward D’Oyley, received word
from scouts that Spanish ships had anchored Rio Nuevo Bay. D’Oyley quickly gathered what
forces could be mustered and led a fleet of ships carrying approximately 700 English troops to
the northern coast. The English forces landed near the mouth of the Rio Nuevo and advanced on
the Spanish position, while the fleet secured vessels that had been reported by scouts. The
Spanish forces, along with recently received reinforcements and supplies from the ships
anchored in the bay, numbered around 450 soldiers. When the English ships were spotted, the
Spanish retreated behind the walls of a coastal fortification. The sizable detachment of English
bombarded the fort and, before long, discovered that one of the walls lay almost entirely
unfinished. The Spanish were routed in short order. One hundred Spanish troops, along with
Ysassi, escaped into the woods. This resounding English victory devastated the Spanish
Jamaicans still clinging to hopes of retaking the island. Not all was lost, however, as the
insurgents held out for another two years with support from the Spanish Crown. It was not until
late 1660, a Maroon palenque was discovered by the English. Colonel Edward D’Oyley,
commander of the English land forces and later Governor of Jamaica, reported to the
Commissioners of the Admiralty that the Maroons,
have done more mischief than in the past two years, having snatched away a
captain, two ensigns, and divers soldiers, and killed others, which hath
necessitated him to set an impost on strong liquors which has had the good
success of finding out where the negroes have lurked these four years
undiscovered who have built a town and planted about 200 acres of provisions.177
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The leader of this community, Juan de Bolas, subsequently parlayed with the English and the
sides negotiated terms for an alliance. The English and De Bolas agreed on terms, guarantees of
liberty and land grants in exchange for services rendered to the colony, and the 12 hostages were
sent from the palenque as assurance of their good faith.
The English for their part were elated at the prospects of an alliance. “[I am] in hourly
expectation,” Dalyson wrote, “of the issue of a party now gone forth in conjunction with some
negroes that have lately, and indeed miraculously, made peace with us.”178 Soon afterward, the
English and the maroons of this palenque began coordinating on operations against the Spanish
and any Spanish-aligned Maroons. On April 10, 1660, Burrough wrote to Blackborne:
the enemy having proffered their friendship and delivered up twelve hostages to
make good their promise; and they, with our men, routed and destroyed two
settlements of other negroes and then took them to the Spanish camp where of
about 140 we killed and took about 80… the Spaniards ‘not dreaming of the
cheat’ were surprised by our men who lay in ambush. About four days since
another settlement was destroyed where 30 negroes were taken.179
The palenque of Juan de Bolas was integrated into the English Jamaican forces at a rapid pace.
They were issued brass kettles, cooking pans, rations, and brandy in accordance with their place
within the military administration and Juan de Bolas and his top officials were also paid twenty
shillings each for their services.180
The precise location of these palenques and the Spanish camps during these early years of
English conquest can be surmised through a combination of English and Spanish archival
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[Figure 3.6] Plano del puerto de Santa Ana (Jamaica), No Scale, 1658, Maps and Plans – Santo Domingo, Archivo
General de Indias, Sevilla, MP-SANTO_DOMINGO, 59.

sources and maps. Blome’s 1671 map [Figure 3.2] situates the “Spanish Quarters” on the
northern coast in the vicinity of what is today Montego Bay. It is likely that the Spanish had an
encampment situated inland on the low-lying hills on the coastal plains – much like the
indigenous had occupied before their arrival. From this location the Spanish could spot ships
arriving with reinforcements, victuals, or to transport individuals to Cuba. Based on Spanish
maps and manuscript archival sources, “el puerto de Santa Ana” (St. Ann’s Port) was also
regularly used as a landing place for reinforcements and victuals because of its commodious
waters. These operations were often done without alerting the English to their presence. In 1658,
the Spanish colonial administration commissioned a map of St. Ann’s Bay, which included plans
for a fortification at the mouth of what the English called “Negro River” [Figure 3.6]. The
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passage detailing the allied English and Maroon operations records the group taking a series of
settlements of “negroes,” in April of 1660 followed by the Spanish camp in short succession.
Spanish sources recount at length the operations from “Las Chorreras,” “Guatibacoa,” and
“Vermejales” and based on details of the devastation wrought in 1660, it is reasonable to
conclude that these locations were all targets of this onslaught [Figure 3.5].181 These coordinated
ambushes transformed the English conquest of colonial Spanish Jamaica. What had been a
defensive posture in the strict confines of St. Jago de la Vega and the southern coast for the first
five years became a proactive and aggressive strategy toward the rooting out of the remnants of
Spanish possession and the establishment of English dominion. The outlying Maroons like “Los
Vermejales,” however, were another matter entirely.
3.4

Restoration, Settlement, and Resistance: English Jamaica After 1660
Juan de Bolas accepted the English offers in 1660, but it would take another three years

for these promises to be realized. In the interim, he and his community provided services in
battle and in the construction of fortifications: “Heads of the declaration for the liberty of the
negroes, to be drawn into a form to serve as a charter to them and their heirs for ever [sic]. For
carrying on the work at Fort Charles.” During these years, the palenque of Juan de Bolas was
called upon regularly, setting the stage for their formal integration into the colonial
administrative structure. On February 1, 1663, the Council of Jamaica formally proclaimed,
That Juan Luyola and the rest of the negroes of his Palenque, on account of their
submission and services to the English, shall have grants of land and enjoy all the
liberties and privileges of Englishmen, but must bring up their children to the
English tongue. That other negroes in the mountains shall enjoy the same benefits,
provided they submit within 14 days after receiving this notice.182
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It was also decided that, “Juan lu [sic] Bola and all the free Negroes shall be in the same state
and freedom as the English enjoy, and shall for every head (being eighteen years old) receive
thirty acres of improvable land to be set in such places as shall be thought fit by the Governor
and Council…”183
The English followed through on these offers, deeding land to individuals from the
palenque as early as 1664.184 The outlying Maroon communities in the mountains did not submit
within fourteen days and were instead emboldened, “they were better pleased with the more
ample range they possessed in the woods, where their hunting-ground was not yet limited by
settlement.”185 This passage in Edward Long’s The History of Jamaica, speaks explicitly to the
geographic elements of Marronage and emphasizes that (in this case) the “Vermaholis Negroes”
staked their claim to the land based upon its use as hunting grounds. Long mentions that these
lands were “not yet limited by settlement” and that the terrain itself provided refuge and
freedom. When Juan de Bolas traveled to Los Vermejales in 1664 to again extend the English
offers of land and liberty, he hoped to recruit Juan de Serras to the English side. Such an alliance
would have effectively neutered the Spanish insurgency.
Juan de Bolas seemingly believed that these legal guarantees would allow the Maroons to
co-exist with the English and to maintain some limited form of self-determination. Juan de
Serras diagreed and he killed de Bolas soon after his arrival. The leader of the “Varmahaly”
Maroons – as they were most often named in the English colonial records – was not swayed by
these English overtures and remembered the role de Bolas had played in their campaigns against
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the outlying Maroons. Grants of “liberty” and “land” from the Europeans who hoped to replace
the Spanish as masters of the island merely signaled to de Serras that their harassment of the
English was working. The divergence in approaches to English conquest is manifest of the
diversity in Maroon communities; distinct cultural traditions and historical experiences
inculcated disparate strategic approaches to imperialism. The would-be conquerors feared the
Maroons that could not be treated with or parlayed.
After the alliance with the de Bolas palenque, outlying Maroon communities continued to
exist in the mountains of Jamaica. Their attacks on settlers posed a direct threat to the English
colony. As Edward Long argues:
other parties remained in the most inaccessible retreats within the mountainous
wilds; where they not only augmented their numbers by procreation, but, after the
island became thicker sown with plantations, they were frequently reinforced by
fugitive slaves, and at length grew confident enough of their force to undertake
descents upon the interior planters, many of whom they murdered from time to
time; and, by their barbarities and outrage, intimidated the Whites from venturing
to any considerable distance from the sea-coast. One of these parties was called
the Vermaholis Negroes.186
The earliest map of English Jamaica that details settlement is Ogilby’s 1671 map, Novissima et
Accuratissima Jamaicae Descriptio, [Figure 3.3] which was based on the surveys of Surveyor
General of Jamaica John Man conducted 1661-1670. This map demonstrates the reticence of
settlers to venture northward or westward beyond Clarendon, corroborating Long’s writings.
Archival documents from 1670 make the cause-and-effect relationship between Maroon
aggression and a lack of settlement on the northside of the island explicit. For example, a letter to
the secretary of state argued:
besides the frequent spoils and robberies they have committed, last week six
Christian hunters were killed. They were the negroes that have been long out,
which of late appear very frequently amongst the old settlements, and may at any
time destroy them…whoever takes any such to the prison receives 20s., if from
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the north side 40s. Can say nothing with certainty of the number out, but the
number of Indians, mulattos, and negroes…much exceeds that of those who call
themselves Christians, and daily increases. Christians daily decrease.187
Restricting settlement on the northside of the island forestalled the agricultural development of
Jamaica and prevented the English from achieving the initial purpose of the Western Design.
Oliver Cromwell, Robert Rich, Thomas Gage, and John Disbrowe were all driven by the desire
to conquer and colonize territories in the Spanish Americas and to develop them as plantation
economies that would generate profit for England – and themselves – by producing cash
crops.188 This group clung to these aspirations for over a decade and saw Santo Domingo and
then Jamaica as an opportunity to accomplish what had been denied them previously with the
Providence Island Colony. However, when Cristobal Ysassi finally left Jamaica for Cuba in
1660, effectively ensuring conquest for England, these administrators of the Western Design
were no longer around to enact their long-held plans. Thomas Gage died in Jamaica in 1656
shortly after the taking of St. Jago de la Vega and Robert Rich and Oliver Cromwell both died in
London in 1658. Cromwell was succeeded as Lord Protector by his son Richard, but without the
support of Parliament or the New Model Army. His eventual removal and the power vacuum that
ensued led to the Restoration of the English monarchy and the coronation of King Charles II.
John Disbrowe, despite instigating the events that led to the removal of Richard Cromwell from
power, was banned from holding public office post-Restoration and was imprisoned in the Tower
of London on suspicion of treason in the 1660s. The peopling and exploitation of Jamaica
became the project of the Crown and wealthy merchants connected and loyal to King Charles II.
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In the short term, the Restoration led to turmoil in colonial administration; Jamaican
colonists languished in anticipation of a decision whether the restored king would retain the
island conquered by Cromwell. When Charles II declared in 1661 that Jamaica would remain
English, it meant that the island would indeed remain part and parcel of the expanding vision of
the English Americas.189 However, despite defeating the Spanish, ending warfare with the Treaty
of Madrid, and installing a royalist colonial government, King Charles II and Jamaica’s
administrators were frustrated in their attempts to realize the island’s agricultural potential thanks
to the hostilities of the Maroons. The 1660s therefore represent a tremendous shift in the history
of English colonialism of Jamaica. The battle for European conquest reached its conclusion and
the victors began to plot a path forward for settlement.
Some holdovers from the Western Design, like Edward D’Oyley, continued to govern in
Jamaica for a brief time post-Restoration, but Charles II wanted those loyal to him in power.
D’Oyley was replaced by the staunch royalist Thomas Hickman-Windsor in 1662, who spent
mere months on the island before being replaced by a more capable administrator. In 1664,
Thomas Modyford was named Governor of Jamaica by a royal commission with a checkered
past as a part-time royalist during the English Civil War and the era of the Protectorate.
However, Modyford had amassed a fortune built on decades of enslaved labor on his sugar
plantations in Barbados and, while doing so, established important connections as a factor in the
Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa. His uneven support for King Charles II
paled in comparison to the wealth he could generate the English Crown in Jamaica using
enslaved African labor. From 1655 to 1660, a single Dutch slaving ship arrived and disembarked
85 enslaved African laborers in Jamaica. In the year 1665 alone, nearly 3,000 enslaved African
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were disembarked on the island. The Restoration of King Charles II transformed Jamaica while
conquest was effectively being settled. Now the only impediment standing in the way of the
colony hyperexploiting Jamaica as an agricultural powerhouse were those who Robert Sedgwick
had warned about in 1656. The Maroons remained as “thorns and pricks” in the English side,
especially Modyford’s.190
The Maroon palenques of Juan de Bolas and Juan de Serras followed divergent paths
following the final withdrawal of the Spanish, who continued to attack the island from the sea,
raiding and burning down plantations often over the subsequent decade. After the Spanish were
defeated by the allied English and “Spanish negroes” under de Bolas, the palenque was quickly
integrated into the colonial administration. They were treated in a manner similar to other
regiments in the colonial forces and were incorporated into the colony as landholders. These
“Spanish negroes” were granted all the liberties of an Englishman and were also subject to the
payment of annual quitrents. For all intents and purposes, according to the law of colonial
English Jamaica these individuals were free and on equal footing with common English
landholders of the day.
The English attempted to parlay with and make overtures to the palenque of Juan de
Serras on numerous occasions during the 1660s. The maroons’ continued refusal to accept these
offers and active hostilities toward colonists frustrated the administration. In August 1665 the
island was put in a posture of war because of the aggressions of the “Carmahaly negroes.”191 A
month later bounties were declared by Governor Modyford at a Council of War:
whoever shall bring to the Governor that Varmahaly negro commonly called the
Sergeant-Major, dead or alive, shall have 30l. reward, 20l. reward for any other
190
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negro officer, and 10l. for any of the common negroes of that gang. Any servant
or slave killing or bringing in one of those negroes shall be free; any Varmahaly
negro bringing in one of his fellows shall be pardoned and set free; and any
persons finding out the pallenque of said negroes, shall have and enjoy to their
uses all the women, children, and plunder for their reward.192
The Varmahaly and other “outlying negroes” became the primary focus of English colonists on
the island after 1660, with notable exceptions in the 1690s. They represented an undeniable and
unavoidable threat to the colonial project: to persist as an independent and antagonistic force on
the island suggested to other enslaved Africans that marronage offered a viable alternative. The
threat posed by the Maroons was both real and existential.
Despite the considerable ethnic diversity of the population of Spanish Jamaica – enslaved
and free Africans, enslaved and free indigenous islanders, Spaniards and other Europeans, and
every conceivable combination of these backgrounds – the unifying identifier for any individual
of African descent to the English was their “blackness.” In the English record, there was a clear
distinction drawn between the “Spanish negroes” and the “rebellious,” “villainous,” or
“traitorous” “negroes” from the palenque of Juan de Serras, but “negro” was always included.
Over the course of many decades, this would evolve into a stark racial divide between the
“white” Europeans and the “black” Maroons and enslaved Africans even though the
“Varmahaly” themselves and other outlying Maroon communities explicitly rejected new
runaways recently imported from Africa, known as “bozales,” who had been imported by the
English.193 Despite their first-hand experiences with the allied “Spanish negroes,” the concept of
“blackness” in the minds of the English became an intrinsic and paradoxical part of an
individual’s cosmography: to be black was to be enslaved, the source of wealth for the colony,
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and its greatest threat. In the first decades of English colonization post-conquest these
distinctions first began to coalesce and harden.
English dominion over the former Spanish colony of Jamaica was formally established
with the Treaty of Madrid in 1670. The diplomatic resolution of these competing claims enabled
the Crown to direct its energies to securing the island and surveying, parceling, and deeding land
to those who would relocate from England or elsewhere in the English colonial Americas to
settle and plant the island. This process began in earnest in 1661 when King Charles II
proclaimed that any settler “above 12 years of age” be granted thirty acres of land if they take up
residence in Jamaica, but planters were reticent to move to Jamaica amidst open warfare with
Spain and soldiers often refused to become planters.194 In the second half of the seventeenth
century there was also the broader emerging cultural emphasis on scientifically rationalizing and
mapping the natural world that emanated from the Enlightenment.195 Each of these factors were
mutually reinforcing. Maps allowed the English to project dominion over Jamaica while surveys
of the island began the process of rationalizing the landscape in the scientific terms established
by the Enlightenment. Surveys allowed for the Crown to deed parcels of land to prospective
settlers who could implement the most effective, proven agricultural methods of the day.
Production by these planters would then help to generate markets and attract private merchants to
the island to whom these crops could be sold to generate wealth for themselves, the planters, the
colony, and most importantly England. Fundamental to this process, however, was the artificial
suppression of labor costs using enslaved African labor.
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Early English maps of Jamaica feature the “Spanish Quarters” and various “Palinks [sic]”
on the island. Rather than pretending as though the island was without contestation, mapmakers
sought to present the frontiers and obstacles to English colonialism. Maps included these
locations as a means of presenting a fully rationalized image of the realities of Jamaica: there
was abundant land to be claimed and the only impediments to settlement were European rivals
since defeated and small, isolated communities of “negroes.” The “Juan de Bolas Palink” makes
an appearance on the Ogilby map published in 1671. This “Palink” is listed alongside dozens of
English-owned plantations and depicted as lying in a valley between the “Porus Mountains” and
“Mount Diabla [sic]” in St. Ann Parish [Figure 3.3]. This location almost assuredly refers to the
pre-alliance settlement, which the English discovered, and not the land deeded to the community
led by Juan de Bolas in 1663. The situation of placenames bearing “Juan de Bolas” today are all
due south in the heart of St. Catherine Parish. The palenque formed during English conquest was
situated there and the land deeded by the English later lay elsewhere, as will be explored.
These maps of Jamaica created by the English in the decades post-conquest provide a
startling contrast to those produced by the Spanish over the preceding decades: the Spanish
Crown’s disinterest and lack of material support prior to the English invasion is apparent from
dearth of maps commissioned of the island, while the English began meticulous surveys as early
as 1661. The English sought Jamaica for its abundant fertile lands for agricultural exploitation
and therefore accurate mapping of topography and hydrography were paramount. Imperial
administration of colonized territories dictated priorities and had material impacts on the lives of
colonists, the lands they exploited, and the populations they enslaved on the frontier. The
juxtaposition of three maps commissioned in 1656-57 by the Spanish colonial administration
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with an eye toward retaking Jamaica and the Blome and Ogilby maps published in London in
1671 lay the prerogatives of these rival European empires bare. In the first case, the Ysla de
Xamaica map of 1656 details only the ports and provides an accurate, yet featureless outline of
the coastline of the island [see Figure 2.3]. Although the mapmaker dutifully accounted for the
various cays bordering Jamaica, they did not attempt an accurate topographical image nor list the
settlements. This map was, in all likelihood, created for the purposes of determining locations for
landing troops in support of Ysassi and the Spanish resistance. Knowledge of the coastal waters
was pivotal information in the case of a reconquest of Jamaica. Costa del sur de la ysla de
Santiago de Jamayca desde la punta de Morante hasta el río de Manatinese con todos sus cayos
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o ysletas, bajos y arreçifes [Figure 3.7] and Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica [Figure 3.8]
are complementary to Ysla de Xamaica and provide a more holistic picture of the natural features
of the southern coastline of Jamaica, including the “Sierra de Bastidas” known today as the Blue
Mountains, and an exhaustive account of the rivers, bays, and inlets. None of these maps provide
intelligence on the English positions or operations beyond the coastal fortifications. Outlining the
northern coastline and harbors eastward or westward of St. Jago de la Vega without the island’s
topography demonstrates a fundamental disconnect between the colonial administration and the
on-the-ground realities of the Spanish insurgency in Jamaica. The information provided by
Planta de las fortificaciones de Jamaica depicts the English defenses in Port Royal with a
startling degree of detail. Each armament and fortification is described and placed in relation to
the natural features of the harbor, such as rivers, promontories, and canals, and provides the
depths of the waters. The need for a map that provided this information raises questions about
the colonial administration and highlights the Spanish Crown’s lack of investment in the
colonization of Jamaica beyond the assertion of dominion.
Despite the marginalization of Jamaica in Spanish imperial schema, the commission of
these maps in 1656-57 speaks to the Spanish Empire’s general political disposition: there was a
tendency to react to the actions of European rivalries and to project dominion outwardly rather
than proactively and effectively managing its colonial territories. Authority within individual
colonies was typically diffused through local administrators and factors. Although rumors of
Cromwell’s Western Design and its failed attempt on Santo Domingo reached St. Jago de la
Vega in advance of the fleet, rivalries within the Spanish colonial hierarchy itself led to the
governors of nearby islands to refuse aid. The Spanish maps of Jamaica produced in the wake of
English invasion were composed after nearly a century-and-a-half of Spanish rule, yet the
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information these maps conveyed was very rudimentary.
Returning to the English map of Jamaica published by John Ogilby in 1671, obvious and
abundant differences emerge [Figure 3.3].196 The Ogilby map illustrates the aspirations of a
totalizing vision of English colonialism predicated on the hyperexploitation of arable land for
cash crop production. Ogilby attempted to accurately depict the terrain of spaces inhabited by
colonists and the rough outlines of those deemed “wilderness” by the colony, each of which had
not been done by any prior Spanish cartographer. The Blue Mountains and Mount Diablo feature
prominently on the map, constructing a limited representation of the interior. Moreover, Ogilby
went to great lengths to place the many rivers, plains, and settlements on the island, outlining the
initial English colonial precincts. The Spanish conceived of colonial authority as emanating from
an administrative center that connected distant points for the purposes of intra-island agricultural
commerce. The exhaustive accounting of the natural resources and topography by Ogilby offers
a far more incorporative and comprehensive representation of the island in the process of survey,
enclosure, settlement, and plantation that laid the foundation for the economy of British Jamaica
in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.197 This work was published in London during the
ascent of the Enlightenment and its contingent scientific revolution. Ogilby’s fixation on
scientifically rationalizing the territory of Jamaica for the use of the English Crown and potential
settlers and investors runs parallel to the work of Dutch cartographers and contributes to a
standardization of English and European mapmaking methods. “Novissima et Accuratissima
Jamaicae Descriptio” is a snapshot of Enlightenment thought that would come to dominate the
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18th century and make possible the work of scientists like Alexander von Humboldt whose work
redefined European notions of imperialism and capitalism. Jamaica was English by means of
conquest, but the island’s landscape itself needed to be re-defined to attract settlers.
For the English, the assertion of dominion necessitated the total utilization of the territory
and the mapmaking of cartographers like John Ogilby visually rationalized Jamaica for
prospective settlers and investors.198 The conquest and subsequent settlement of Jamaica by the
English had brought to light the material and geographic contours of Spanish colonialism on the
island, none more prominent than the liminal spaces left blank on maps. Upon conquest in 1655,
the Spanish took to the wilderness of the interior for refuge.199 Whether consciously or not,
Spanish encounters with indigenous rebels on the island had shown how the natural landscape
could be used as a defense against invasion. Time and time again, the Spanish Jamaican colonists
sought out these spaces in their flight from English privateers.200 Despite desperate pleas from
vecinos, the Spanish Empire never invested its time or efforts into garrisoning or fortifying the
colony. As a result, any settlement or plantation beyond St. Jago de la Vega and the scattered
hatos of the southern coast of the island lacked material support of any kind from the colony or
colonial administration and could not be defended. Vast swaths of the island remained virtually
untouched by colonialism when the English arrived in 1655. The Ogilby map of 1671 makes
efforts to include and accurately represent these spaces in its illustration of the Jamaican
landscape. Unlike the Spanish before them, the English were single-mindedly focused on the
exploiting the island through agriculture. Only by surveying and visually depicting these spaces
could immigrants be attracted to settle and plant them.
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The act of mapping the liminal spaces where indigenous and Maroon resistance persisted
was fundamental to the process of survey, enclosure, commoditization, and incorporation into
the capitalist system. Only by reducing or pacifying these elements could the English achieve
their totalizing vision of colonialism. Their inclusion on maps is a recognition both of their
existence and the threat they posed to the colonial order. Whereas Spanish colonists were content
to ignore indigenous rebels until such time as the situation became untenable, the English were
keenly aware of the geographies of resistance that paralleled the nascent plantation economy.
These maps of Jamaica, which depict nearly two centuries of European colonialism,
emphasize the spatial dynamics of imperial dominion and resistance to it. They demonstrate how
Jamaica was defined in contrast to other Spanish territories and rival European imperial powers,
but a closer reading reveals the outlines of resistance. The very fact that the Spanish Crown or its
colonial administration failed to accurately map the material realities of Jamaica elucidates how
the Empire conceived of territoriality and jurisdiction and the rhetorical considerations inherent
to its exercise of dominion. Maps, as documentary evidence of imperial perceptions, offer a
cohesive representation of these strategies through an investigation of those cartographic and
topographic elements featured or absent. These absences or negations are vested with meaning
by the very nature of their omission. Discrepancies between maps provide insight into the
preoccupations of imperial powers and the divergent methods of understanding and structuring
space. By depicting the geographies of settlement and authority that constituted colonial Jamaica,
cartographers inadvertently outlined geographies of resistance by their rendering of blank and
inaccessible spaces. Maps of Spanish Jamaica constructed a parallel colonial reality that reflected
imperial jurisdiction and framed the contested and liminal terrain of the colonial space. As a
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result, the geographic contours of Spanish dominion, both intentionally and not, forever after
shaped and were shaped by the geographies of indigenous resistance and Marronage in Jamaica.
As the 1660s ended, the external threat of the Spanish was pacified, but the internal
economy of English Jamaica was threadbare. The monocrop plantation system that became a
global powerhouse in the mid-18th century had not yet coalesced and the hundred or so
plantations that existed at the time produced limited quantities of cocoa, cotton, indigo, and
sugarcane, among other cash crops. They were all, with very few exceptions, built alongside the
banks of rivers for access to fresh water for irrigation and concentrated in the inland plains of the
leeward side of the island. The plantations that existed beyond these tight geographic settlement
patterns were at serious risk for attack by Maroons and plunder by pirates or invading European
colonial forces, both of which became omnipresent realities of life in Jamaica in the 1680s and
1690s. The few exceptions to these patterns tended to be larger, wealthier, and more connected
plantation owners who could purchase large numbers of enslaved Africans and hire or indenture
the requisite number of overseers and arms to defend their possessions. Even these plantations,
like those of the Modyford brothers – factors in the Royal African Company –, were susceptible
in the event of invasion, Maroon attack, or enslaved uprising. At this same time, the “Varmahaly
negroes” were relocating to the north and northeast of the island and establishing settlements,
facilitated in part by tricking the colonists through a diplomatic ploy to buy time.201 English
dominion over Jamaica might have been established through conquest of the Spanish colony, but
until the island was settled and fortified it could not be secured against additional threats from
within the island or beyond its shores.

201

Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica, 28-31.

97
Once the Treaty of Madrid was ratified by the Spanish and English Crowns in 1670, King
Charles II and the governors of Jamaica set about incentivizing settlement of the island. This
diplomatic resolution allowed for the colonial administration to survey, parcel, and deed land to
attract settlers, which inexorably led to the expansion of plantations and the physical footprint of
the colony. The outgrowth of plantation agriculture necessitated the establishment and violent
enforcement of colonial authority and its contingent geographies in these regions for defense
against the myriad threats they faced. Maps of English Jamaica based on surveys conducted
thereafter 1670 demonstrate the rapid proliferation of settlements on the northside of the island
and their movement inland from the coasts, drawing settlers into close contact with Jamaica’s
Maroons. Pairing maps with archival and anthropological sources reveals further how the
foundations of English Jamaica were established only through negotiation with these
communities.
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RUNAWAYS AND REBELS: RIVAL GEOGRAPHIES AND THE MAKING OF
ENGLISH JAMAICA, 1670-1700
Treaty negotiations between English diplomat William Godolphin and Spanish diplomat

Gaspar de Bracamonte were nearing their conclusion in June 1670 when the governors of Cuba
and Jamaica each began granting new Commissions of War. Jamaican Governor Thomas
Modyford commissioned Admiral Henry Morgan on June 29, 1670, to, “do and perform all
manner of Exploits which may tend to the preservation and quiet of this Island.” His instructions
were in response to the Cuban governor having landed men on the north side of Jamaica where
they began “burning all the Houses They Came at, Kil[l]ing or taking Prisoners all the
Inhabitants They met with.”202 Godolphin and de Bracamonte signed the Treaty of Madrid on
July 18, 1670 in an effort to end hostilities throughout the territories of the two colonial empires,
with orders that the articles be published in every colony within eight months:
Moreover, it is agreed, that the most Serene King of Great Britain…shall
have…with plenary right of sovereignty, dominion, possession, and propriety, all
those lands, regions, islands, colonies, and places whatsoever…in any part of
America, which the said King of Great Britain and his subjects do at present hold
and possess…203
Before word of the treaty reached Jamaica, however, Admiral Morgan set sail from Port Royal
on August 14, 1670, with “Eleven Sail of Vessels and 600 Men,” later rendezvousing with seven
additional English ships and three French ships that offered their services in war against the
Spanish. Within a month of its signing, the Treaty of Madrid was put to the test.
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During a five-month period from October 1670-February 1671, Morgan and his
privateers ransacked what they could of the Spanish Americas. They took Providence Island,
Santa Catalina, and Fort Lorenzo on the mouth of the Chagres River on the Atlantic Coast of
Panama in short succession. From Fort Lorenzo, the English staged their assault on Panama City,
which they routed with relative ease. The Spanish suffered heavy losses in the battle, burning the
city to the ground in their retreat to prevent the English from plundering it. For nearly a month,
the privateers occupied the suburbs of Panama City, capturing Spaniards as prisoners and looting
what little remained. In the immediate wake of the signing of the Treaty of Madrid, the privateer
force led by Henry Morgan and commissioned by Thomas Modyford had dealt a devastating
blow to the Spanish Empire; its once great port city of Panama lay in ruins.204
Henry Morgan’s 1670-71 campaign was officially regarded with opprobrium by King
Charles II and the English colonial administration when word reached London. Outwardly, the
English Crown lamented that Governor Modyford acted on his own volition and not under orders
from the King, insisting that Morgan and Modyford had gone rogue. Morgan and his privateers
had not yet taken Panama City when Charles II ordered the revocation of the Modyford’s
governorship on January 4, 1670. Thomas Lynch reached Jamaica in June 1671 and replaced
Modyford as governor, who was put under arrest and transported back to London to answer for
his actions. Henry Morgan met the same fate in April 1672 on separate orders from the Crown
meant to appease the infuriated Spaniards who were considering retaliatory measures. Both men
were reported to have been imprisoned in the Tower of London upon arrival, although Morgan
served his time under house arrest.205
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Modyford and Morgan’s fall from grace proved to be a brief interlude rather than the
conclusion to their tales. Two years of attempts to entice the Spanish to open their ports to
English ships and commerce had proved fruitless and King Charles II dropped the pretense and
revoked their imprisonment as a result.206 In January 1674, the two were released and Henry
Morgan was celebrated in London. In November, Morgan was named a Knight Bachelor and
sent back to Jamaica to serve as Lieutenant-Governor alongside John Vaughan, also a Knight
Bachelor and a Member of Parliament, after Thomas Lynch had fallen out of favor with King
Charles II.207 The following April, Thomas Modyford also returned to Jamaica where he was
named Chief Justice of the island. The very next day, Charles Modyford – cousin to James and
Thomas – was named Surveyor General of Jamaica.208 This rapid reversal by the English King
outraged the Spanish royals and the colonial administration in Sevilla, who saw the return of
Morgan and Modyford to the colony as a provocation and a threat to their American territories.
In 1670, King Charles II had sought peace with Spain and offered up the Jamaican duo of
Morgan and Modyford – the rogue privateer and governor – as sacrifices for this cause, but by
1675 the English King was disabused of the notion that the two kingdoms could peaceably
coexist in the region.
The return of Henry Morgan and Thomas Modyford to Jamaica reshaped the internal
political dynamics of the colony overnight. Thomas Lynch had been hostile toward privateers
during his governorship, in line with the stated position of the English Crown and made efforts to
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prevent them from trading or selling plunder in Port Royal. The appointment of Morgan as
Lieutenant-Governor and Modyford as the Chief Justice reversed, or at least softened, the stance
of the colonial government in the short-term. This was much to the chagrin of Governor
Vaughan, who did not see eye-to-eye with his second in command. Modyford was, however, a
close confidant of Vaughan’s despite being widely hated by assemblymen and planters of the
colony for having been in league with the privateers as governor.209
Upon their arrival and (re-)installation in Jamaica’s colonial government, Modyford,
Morgan, and Vaughan each acquired plantations on the north side of the island. Modyford’s
enslaved labor force cultivated “Cacao Walkes,” while Vaughan’s planted a “Cotton worke,” and
Morgan invested in a “Sugar worke” [Figure 4.2].210 The cotton and sugar plantations were
situated inland from Port Maria, with Vaughan’s property farther into the mountains. Modyford
also acquired a sugar plantation in northern St. John’s Parish and had an estate in St. Dorothy’s
Parish (both are now part of St. Catherine Parish).
This expansion into the interior from the coast signaled a transition in the official
approach to settling and exploiting Jamaica. In March 1662, the colonial administration in
Whitehall sent Thomas Windsor instructions, which included, “To contrive that the plantations
be near together and the sea coast first planted, the better to prevent invasion.”211 The Treaty of
Madrid meant that invasions – at least in the short-term and by the Spanish – were no longer the
primary, immediate concern of colonists. The return of Modyford and Morgan to Jamaica in
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1675 also demonstrated that King Charles II felt confident that Spain would not attempt a
reconquest of the island. Their subsequent efforts to obtain land for plantations on the northside
were therefore a byproduct of peace with Spain, which allowed for a certain amount of security
for these projects.212 The colonists could now focus their energies on expanding the colony to
incorporate regions previously unsettled by the Spanish. Three months following the arrival of
Governor Vaughan, Lieutenant-Governor Morgan, and Chief Justice Modyford, the trio
contracted with the Royal African Company to purchase 41 enslaved African laborers for their
respective estates.213 Vaughan and Morgan very quickly became regular fixtures at the slave
markets in Port Royal from 1675-76 to supply their properties with labor. As the owners of
sugar, cotton, and cacao plantations, all three men were distinctly aware of the need for enslaved
African labor to achieve the rates of profit that had been heralded by planters in Barbados in the
1650s.214
4.1

The Royal African Company, Sugar Production, and Resistance in Jamaica
The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa was chartered in 1660 by King

Charles II and granted an exclusive monopoly over trade along the western coast of Africa.
Within three years, the Company, headed by the King’s brother James II, was also given sole
control over the slave trade. Despite these royal privileges, it fell into heavy debt during the
Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1667 and relinquished its charter in 1672 only to be replaced by the
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Royal African Company.215 The charter granted to the Royal African Company gave it far more
latitude to impose brutal force in the subjugation and exploitation of Western African lands and
peoples, including the building of fortifications and “castles” where the enslaved were processed
for transportation to the Americas. To avoid the same fate that befell its predecessor, the Royal
African Company pursued a payment process that required purchasers to pay in three
installments.
Demand for enslaved labor in Jamaica grew throughout the 1670s and planters
complained constantly that the supply from the Company was insufficient. Despite its expansion
along the western coast of Africa and its measures to forestall taking on extensive debts, the
Royal African Company took a conservative approach toward meeting the demands of Jamaican
planters. Even still, Company officials complained to the colonial administration in 1676 that
planters in Jamaica alone owed £25,000.216 As the profitability of sugar production increased in
the 1670s and into the 1680s, larger landholders were compelled to acquire and consolidate
properties to maximize output.217 Demands for enslaved labor tracked with the growth of sugar
plantations and rose precipitously during this period. The Royal African Company was hesitant
to meet these demands due to understandable fears about insolvency related to approving large
purchases entirely on credit. This depressed the supply of enslaved African laborers to Jamaica
and the planters, for their part, complained constantly to the colonial administration that
Company officers and factors were mismanaging assets on the island and in Company accounts.
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Jamaican planters argued that they only owed roughly half of the debt reported by the Royal
African Company to the Lords of Trade.218 The Company was ordered to supply Jamaica with
enslaved laborers at a rate of 3,000 per year and by 1676 it appears that these needs were being
met, albeit at a considerably higher price than more established colonies and with exorbitant
interest rates.219 The Lords of Trade were called in to arbitrate the dispute between the colony
and the Royal African Company in 1679 and, understanding the precarious position of the
fledgling colony, decided in favor of the Jamaican colonists. In 1680, King Charles II ordered
that the Company provide planters more time to repay their debts, while also providing the island
with 3,000 enslaved laborers per year at a rate of £18 per person, nearly a 20% decrease. The
matter was not resolved until 1684 when the King scrapped the order and instead instituted a new
contract: the Royal African Company must supply Jamaica with 5,000 enslaved laborers per year
and in return the planters would foreswear all dealings with private traders.220 During the period
of 1680-1687, an average of 3,287 enslaved Africans were disembarked in Jamaica, which
placated the voracious desires of planters and achieved an amicable détente between the sides.
The influx of enslaved Africans throughout the 1670s and 1680s led to a sharp increase in
the proportion of enslaved laborers to overseers on plantations. The population of Africans
imported to Jamaica during this period was both large and diverse and planters had little
discretion over the origin of the enslaved laborers they purchased.221 During the period of 1670-
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1680, almost seventy-six percent of the enslaved Africans brought to Jamaica came from the
Gold Coast, the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Biafra, and West Central Africa as the Royal
African Company pulled from every region to meet growing demand.222 The rapid increase in
the enslaved population during the 1670s emboldened runaways and Maroon populations across
the island as the white colonial population failed to keep pace.223
Thomas Modyford, while acting as governor in 1670, responded to attacks by the
“Varmahaly Negroes” in Clarendon with orders that any resident of the parish would be subject
to fine and imprisonment if they “shall travel two miles or above from his dwelling place,
without a pistol.”224 The situation became tense enough that the Varmahaly eventually removed
themselves to the northeast of the island in the early 1670s. This led to a brief period of détente
between the Maroons and the colonists on the island that was interrupted by enslaved uprisings
in 1673, when 200 individuals rebelled in St. Ann’s Parish and fled southwest into Clarendon
and St. Elizabeth and were never displaced by the colonists despite their repeated attempts.225
Tensions may have cooled momentarily between the colony and the “Varmahaly,” but there was
no peace for the enslaved, who existed under the constant yoke of violent oppression and
exploitation and never ceased resisting.226 These enslaved rebels from St. Ann’s likely formed
the original Maroon communities that today occupy Cockpit Country and especially in its
western extents.
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The Council of Jamaica first began to institute rules for the “better ordering” of the
enslaved population in 1664, but with the influx of African laborers throughout the 1670s and
1680s, additional orders were put into effect. The colony had been preoccupied with the
“rebellious negroes” in the 1660s and offered incentives for capturing or killing members of the
“Varmahaly,” but the threat posed by the rapidly growing enslaved population was, for the most
part, ignored by the colonial government.227 To further compound the matter, natural disasters,
disease, and coastal raids on plantations by foreign powers during the twenty-year period of
1673-1693 reduced the white population of the colony from a high of 7,768 men, women, and
children to as few as 1,400.228 In September 1686, these two internal pressures converged when
the Assembly of Jamaica issued instructions for planters in the northeast of the island for the
“reduction of rebellious negroes,” much like the Spanish Jamaican Governor Melgarejo had in
1601, and offered a reward of £1,000 for the “suppressors of the negro rebellion before
Christmas.”229 The colony was confronting an internal war on two fronts: on the plantations and
in the mountains. Africans and their descendants, rather than the rival Spanish or French,
represented the most serious challenge to English colonialism in Jamaica.230 They saw both the
threat to, and source of, the advancement of their economic interests as stemming from the
“negro,” which by the 1680s had become synonymous with “slave” in the English imaginary.
The more that Jamaican planters expanded the footprint of sugarcane production on the
island, the more arable land they needed, which increased the demand for enslaved African
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labor. The result was a rapid increase in the disparity on the island between Europeans and
Africans as the growth of the enslaved African population vastly outpaced colonial oversight. In
1670, there were an estimated 15,198 residents of Jamaica, with 10,942 enslaved Africans
having been disembarked on the island during the 1660s.231 The only census available for the
year 1680 is that of Port Royal and St. John – which was later merged with St. Catherine and
included Guanaboa Vale – which lists 1,822 “white” inhabitants 1,421 “black” inhabitants.
Given that Port Royal was primarily a merchant district, the ratio of 1,623 “white” inhabitants to
just 670 “black” inhabitants is in line with expectations. In the far more agricultural parish of St.
John, however, there were 751 “black” inhabitants as compared to 199 “white inhabitants.” By
1680, the “black” population of Jamaica represented twenty-three percent of the total living in all
English possessions.232 Jamaica’s planters were vastly outnumbered and the size of the enslaved
African population of the island continued to swell throughout the remainder of the seventeenth
century until, in 1703, stricter laws were passed that mandated, “every planter to keep 1 white
servant for his first 10 Negroes, 2 for the first 20 and 1 for every 20 thereafter.”233
The “white” population of Jamaica was concentrated in Port Royal and St. Jago de la
Vega as opposed to the “black” population that occupied plantations across the island. Although
we do not have census data for parishes like St. Ann, St. Marie, and St. George where frontier
plantations were cleared and planted in the late 1670s, the disparities of the population
demographics were almost assuredly more pronounced than southern parishes. Moreover,
because the “rebellious negroes” existed outside of the framework of colonial society, they were
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not included in these censuses upon flight from bondage. During this period there were no
discernible towns on the northside of the island and the colony offered what little it could in the
way of protection without material support from the colonial administration. Maroons operated
with complete autonomy outside of periodic clashes with irregular colonial forces that were
raised when the necessity arose.234 Often these forces in the 1670s and 1680s were constituted by
buccaneers and led by Henry Morgan, who was materially invested in the security of plantations
on the northside of the island.235
Amidst these transformations taking place within Jamaica, the Royal African Company
successfully fulfilled the terms of the new contract outlined by King Charles II in 1684, and it
appears from the lack of complaints about debts that the Jamaican planters were largely able to
maintain payments on their debts as well. Despite internal instabilities, the plantocracy of
Jamaica remained myopically focused on profit margins and acquired as many enslaved laborers
as could be sold. However, this détente between the Jamaican planters and the Royal African
Company was rendered irrelevant in 1688. Charles II died in 1685 and the successor to the
throne, James II, who was the Duke of York and head of the Royal African Company, was
deposed in the Glorious Revolution. The Company had been chartered based on the royal
prerogative of King Charles II and with James II at the head of it. The removal from power and
exile of James II therefore completely undermined their political position and forced Company
officials to negotiate with the government of William of Orange and Mary II – the daughter of
James II – to maintain their monopoly on the slave trade in England. The importation of enslaved
African labor into Jamaica slowed almost to a halt in the period of 1688-1690 as the government
of William and Mary refused to back the Royal African Company in the enforcement of its
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monopoly. The trade finally rebounded in 1691, but the supply remained inconsistent until the
year 1700 when there were 8,948 enslaved Africans disembarked in Jamaica alone. However,
this largely did not benefit the Company since a large portion were sold by private traders who
had been emboldened and enabled by the government under William and Mary.236
4.2

Jamaican Plantations and the Emergence of the Maroons
Mapping the expansion of Jamaican plantations alongside colonial legislation that details

encounters with, or campaign against, the “rebellious negroes” reveals the physical dimensions
of territories claimed and occupied by Maroons. A life of Marronage is inherently dynamic given
its reliance on the biodiversity of natural landscapes for survival and subsistence. In the late
seventeenth century Jamaica’s Maroons in the northeast of the island embedded themselves in
hills of St. George in an array of settlements that used the mountainous, isolated surroundings for
protection, with dwellings built on rocky precipices. The slow, but inexorable expansion of
plantations into regions bordering and encroaching on these rival geographies in the 1670s and
beyond brought these communities into direct conflict with the English colony.237 The political
boundaries drawn by the settlement, cultivation, and resistance of the so-called “rebellious
negroes” constitute the geographies of Jamaican Marronage. Plotting these territories and their
contingent spaces on maps produced from colonial surveys at the end of the seventeenth century
demonstrates how the shape and nature of English colonialism that emerged later in the
eighteenth century was founded through negotiation with these oppositional and antagonistic
forces. Maroons embraced the isolation afforded by the nature of settlement in the late
seventeenth century, but their near-constant raids on frontier plantations and their clashes with
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colonial forces make clear that resistance to expansion shaped the colony just as it was shaped
itself by colonial aggression.
The expansion of plantations on the northside of the island began with a diversity of crop
production. There were sugar plantations in great abundance on the southern side of the island,
which was less mountainous and required less labor to clear, but these practices had resulted in
soil exhaustion and extensive droughts by 1670.238 Initial settlers on the northern side, especially
along the banks of Wag Water River and Dry River, focused their efforts on cacao production
despite the “blast” that wiped out cacao crops island-wide in 1670.239 Indigo and cotton were
also still grown in considerable amounts at the end of the 1680s, with cotton plantations
concentrated along the northern coast between Rio Bueno and Ocho Rios, due west of
settlements of Morgan, Vaughan, and Modyford in St. Ann [Figure 3.2]. The diversification of
crop production meant that labor needs were not uniform and in these early decades the smaller
landholders were able to produce crop harvests without the sizeable labor demands required for
sugar plantations. Cacao, cotton, and indigo also required less land to be cleared and could be
grown on a smaller scale at a profit, whereas sugar plantations necessitated large crop fields with
an enslaved labor force of sufficient size. Thomas Modyford, Henry Morgan, and John Vaughan
were early to sugar production in English Jamaica. They took advantage of their positions within
the colonial government – and in the case of Modyford his cousin’s appointment as Surveyor
General – to acquire estates large enough to support their aspirations.240 The proliferation of each
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agricultural pursuit expanded the geography of the colony by incorporating additional regions of
the island into its regimes of oversight and authority. Evidence of the expansion of these regimes
is visible on Edward Slaney’s 1678 work Tabula Jamaicae Insula, which features “Gunters
Garisson [sic]” in northern St. John’s and a breastwork situated just west of the border of
Clarendon [Figure 4.1]. Neither military position existed on Blome’s map of 1671 or Ogilby’s
map of the same year, and both were established in the wake of significant enslaved uprisings
nearby.241 The Jamaican colonists constructed the garrison as a fortified location from which
they could venture further into the uncleared and unsettled territories to the north of St. Jago de
la Vega and as a bulwark against nearby uprisings of enslaved laborers. The breastwork west of
Clarendon provided defense against an invasion landing in the more unsettled territories of St.
Elizabeth. There were additional fortifications and breastworks constructed in and around Port
Royal for the defense of the island, but in the seventeenth century this framework of security
failed to reach the northside of the island. Proximity was necessary for these positions to serve a
purpose against opposing forces and the Maroons fought on their terms, in their territories,
except in the case of strategic raids on isolated plantations for needed supplies.
The colonial infrastructure existed to support efforts at settlement and plantation, which
included the building of highways, clearing of land, and armed assistance against the hostile
bands of “rebellious negroes” that took up residence in Cockpit Country and the Blue Mountains
throughout the 1670s.242 The building of frontier plantations did not explicitly target the
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[Figure 4.1] Edward Slaney, Tabula Jamaicae Insula, Scale 1:462,000, (London: Robert Morden, 1678).

Maroons, but any expansion of the infrastructure of the colony was hostile to Marronage. These
Maroon settlements, once isolated, before long began to feel the presence of the colony through
these frontier settlements. On January 23, 1676, the Council of Jamaica was convened to discuss
the ongoing issue of “rebellious negroes” in St. Mary Parish, which was home to the “Cacao
Walke” of Modyford, the “Cotton worke” of Vaughan, and the “Sugar worke” of Morgan
[Figure 4.2]. Given the proximity of Maroons to the plantations of the three most influential
colonists on the island, Governor Vaughan and the Council of Jamaica decided that a standing
force of twenty soldiers be established, “until said negroes be subdued,” and specified rewards
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for capturing or killing the individuals “Peter,” “Scanderberg,” and “Doctor.”243 It is likely that
these individuals were leaders of the rebels who had settled in the mountains of St. Mary and it is
clear from their names that they were not of the “Spanish Negroes.” Less than a month later, the
Council convened again to order that Articles of War against the “rebellious negroes” be
published throughout the island and to station guards at the “crawles” of “Captain Bourden” and
“Lieutenant Hysom,” the latter of which lay in the hills nearby Vaughan’s cotton plantation.
Governor Vaughan reported just three days later that “eight or nine have been taken and
executed…hopes they are wholly reduced or dispersed.”244 The Maroons in the mountains of St.
Mary Parish were under assault by the colony.
The differences between John Vaughan and Henry Morgan, his second in command,
finally reached a breaking point as the campaign against the Maroons in St. Mary Parish took
place. Vaughan wrote to Secretary of State Joseph Williamson and reiterated to the Lord Privy

[Figure 4.2] Charles Bochart and Humphrey Knollis, A new & exact mapp of the island of Jamaica: with ye true and
iust scituation of ye severall townes & churches, No Scale, (London: Charles Harper, 1684).
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Seal, the Earl of Angelsea, in May 1676 that his Lieutenant-Governor, “contrary to his duty and
trust, endeavours to set up privateering, and has obstructed all my designs and purposes for the
reducing of those that do use that curse of life…”245
Morgan leaned on influential friends to maintain his position despite the repeated
complaints of Vaughan to the colonial administration. On one occasion, King Charles II himself
intervened on behalf of Morgan, reinstating him as Deputy Governor following his unilateral
removal by Vaughan.246 During his tenure as governor, Vaughan earnestly attempted to enact the
King’s orders despite objections from planters. He was especially rapacious as it related to
suppressing privateering and piracy in the Americas and used the full might of his position to
prosecute interloping private slave traders. This was much to the benefit of the Royal African
Company, but angered planters whose demands at the time were not being met by the Company
and private merchants who opposed their monopoly. Vaughan’s assault on private slave trading
and privateering effectively alienated a large portion of the Jamaican colonial elite during his
time as governor, including Morgan and the Modyfords. When Vaughan was dismissed from
office in April 1678, the Assembly declared martial law and Morgan wasted little time executing
plans to fortify Port Royal Harbor (now Kingston Harbor) with two additional batteries,
something the deposed governor had been loath to put into effect.247 Despite this ignominious
end to his tenure as governor, Vaughan joined the ranks of The Royal Society after his return to
London, eventually becoming its president, and assumed the role of Third Earl of Carbery. His
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actions as governor may have won him no friends in Jamaica, but John Vaughan was celebrated
by his aristocratic peers in England.248
The Earl of Carlisle, Charles Howard, was appointed Governor of Jamaica in 1678 with
strict instructions to institute laws emanating from London. Howard hoped to achieve this by
dissolving the Assembly, which infuriated the plantocracy which dominated local governance.
Opponents of this act, like future Governor William Beeston and Speaker of the House Samuel
Long, were arrested and sent in chains to London to stand trial for their defiance.249 King Charles
II once again sided against the governor he had appointed, reinstating the Assembly along with
all prior members. Charles Howard was recalled to England in 1680 and was replaced by Henry
Morgan as acting governor. The privateer-turned-politician once again found himself at the
highest echelon of Jamaican governance, but his stay too was short-lived.
In September 1677 there was a “rebellion of the Northside negroes” that was brought
before the Council of Jamaica for debate and in July of the following year, the then newly
appointed Governor Carlisle wrote to the Secretary of State about, “the negroes who have been
lately very outrageous.”250 The threat posed by runaways and “rebellious negroes” seems to have
been underestimated or perhaps misunderstood by the King and colonial administration. In
August 1681, Henry Morgan who had yet again risen to acting governor wrote to the Secretary
of State Leoline Jenkins about concerns regarding “public remour [sic]” which intimated that
King Charles II would disband the two companies of troops stationed in Jamaica. Morgan
mentioned that this had long been whispered without substantiation in Jamaica, but his plea to
Jenkins indicates that he had begun to take them seriously. In his letter, he emphasized the
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importance of these troops to the internal and external security of the colony, “They are
constantly employed either at sea or ashore, in bringing in runaway or rebellious negroes or
reducing of pirates, who…are very numerous.”251 The King and the English colonial
administration largely ignored the warnings of the battle-tested Morgan, and the regiments were
later disbanded.
The 1680s were a transitional period for English colonial Jamaica. The removal of Henry
Morgan and his replacement by Thomas Lynch in 1682 was to be the final appointment made by
Charles II before his passing in 1685. It emphasized the King’s desire to fill the highest ranks of
colonial governments with men loyal to London alone. This further exacerbated the situation of
planters on the northside of Jamaica who did not possess the means to combat enslaved uprisings
and Maroon resistance, but who nevertheless purchased enslaved African labor in large numbers.
During these years, the Royal African Company managed to satisfy the demands of planters who
continued to expand inland from the coast on the northside of island. This expansion of
plantation encroached on Maroon territories while also increasing the population of enslaved
Africans on the island who in turn fled in larger numbers and engaged in Marronage. Populations
on multiple plantations in Guanaboa Vale, located roughly eight miles northwest of St. Jago de la
Vega in the hills of St. Catherine Parish, revolted in rapid succession in 1685 and laid waste to
the area. These runaways split into multiple parties, the most aggressive of which migrated
northward into St. Mary Parish and fought against colonial regiments for the next two years.252
The Maroons and the runaways who swelled their numbers became such an omnipresent
threat that by 1686 the colony had exhausted all funds dedicated to “serving against the negroes”
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and the Council ordered that each parish “provide for its own security.”253 At this same time, the
Royal African Company was disembarking nearly 4,000 enslaved African in Jamaica per year.
As plantations grew and profits were pursued, the situation for Jamaican planters on the
northside of the island was rapidly deteriorating. In March of 1686, planters on the southside
were abruptly acquainted with these threats when there was a large uprising on the Gay
plantation in St. John.254 Lieutenant-Governor Molesworth – who was himself a prominent
planter whose properties produced every variety of cash crop – declared martial law and made an
impassioned speech to the Assembly of Jamaica in June 1686 describing the situation for
planters on the island:
I have summoned you to advise how to secure ourselves and estates against the
barbarous treachery of our slaves, to keep them in order and to dissuade others
from joining such as are rebellious. You know the expense to which we have been
put, the mischiefs that have been committed on divers poor families, and our
efforts to suppress the rebels under the disadvantages of no money and a crippled
power over the militia.255
Three days later, the Assembly of Jamaica reported that, “The forts are in so good a condition
that they cannot be improved without making them new.”256 The Assembly made no mention of
the services of soldiers at sea against pirates and interlopers, but it appears colonists were at least
confident in their ability to defend against invasion in 1686 based upon the state of the island’s
fortifications.
Amidst the revolving door of governance in the late 1670s and into the early 1680s,
planters in the northern parishes of St. George, St. Marie, and St. Ann moved forward with the
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expensive task of clearing land for plantations.257 By the printing of Bochart and Knollis’s “A
new & exact mapp of the island of Jamaica: with ye true and iust scituation of ye severall townes
& churches” in 1684 there were at least six established cacao plantations along the Spanish
River, nearby cotton plantations, and a large concentration of cacao plantations in the western
half of St. George between the Wagwater and Buff Bay Rivers [Figure 4.2]. Slowly, but surely,
planters seized new territory and reshaped it to their agricultural designs. At the same time, the
Maroons continued to build out their settlements in the southern extents of St. George at the base
of the Blue Mountains. Unlike their colonial counterparts, the Maroons used the natural
landscape to their advantage rather than bending it to their whim and had, by 1686, created
multiple substantial settlements in this region of the island. One such community included fifteen
huts, each of which contained several “cabins” for cohabitation, constructed on precipices. There
were also about twenty miles of traps for catching wild hogs and “divers plantations” totaling an
approximate twenty acres of crops.258 In contrast, Molesworth wrote to William Blathwayt in
September 1686 describing the dire circumstances of planters in the northeastern parishes of the
island, emphasizing the precarity of, “those of St. George's (who), unless relieved, are prepared
to desert their settlements.”259 Molesworth struggled to convince the Jamaican plantocracy to
voluntarily consent to a tax from which funds could be reliably drawn for raising troops to
combat the “rebellious negroes” and depended on volunteers until finally instituting martial law
in desperation. Over the course of the next year, troops assigned by Molesworth marched
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through the regions where the Maroons had been sighted and when they found a settlement they
set fire to provision grounds, destroyed hog snares, and chased the inhabitants from their homes.
This “success” seems to have had little long-term effect beyond further antagonizing these
communities who exacted their revenge against northside planters over the course of the next
decade, regularly raiding and ransacking these plantations.260
The continued existence of the “rebellious negroes” was anathema to the Jamaican
colonists. The groups were an impediment to the clearing and settling of vast swaths of arable
land on the northside of the island in St. George, St. Ann, and later St. James and the colonial
forces had effected no change to this dynamic by the end of the 1680s. With each passing year
more enslaved Africans revolted and escaped into the woods across the island, continuing the
patterns established under Spanish colonialism. In a single uprising in 1691, 400 enslaved
laborers on the plantation of Thomas Sutton in southwestern Clarendon Parish along the banks of
the Milk River rebelled [Figure 4.2]. Half of these rebels were killed within three weeks, but the
remainder escaped and formed a community in the southern reaches of St. James. There are both
an “Old Palink” and a “Negro Palink” included on Bochart and Knollis’s map published in 1684.
The “Negro Palink” is situated on this map almost exactly where Cudjoe Town – later “Trelawny
Town” – was in southern St. James, adjacent to the “Spanish Crawl.” This suggests that
runaways might have inhabited this location and the “Old Palink” before the arrival of the rebels
from Sutton’s plantation, potentially during the time of the Spanish insurgency. The leader of
this group, the “Cudjoe” for whom the town was originally named, struck fear in the hears of
Jamaican planters for decades to follow.261
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4.3

Devastation and Consolidation: Jamaica in the 1690s
On June 7, 1692, just before noon, a devastating earthquake struck Jamaica. The

earthquake caused a landslide in Port Royal Harbor that submerged or destroyed close to ninety
percent of the buildings of the merchant hub and generated a tsunami that exposed the seabed of
the harbor before pounding the coastline.262 Approximately 2,000 people were killed, and for
months afterward the impacts of the earthquake caused additional landslides that swallowed up
entire plantations.263 The colony lay in ruins: plantations were destroyed, planters and merchants
perished, all the island’s fortifications were either wrecked or greatly compromised, and the
ships in Port Royal Harbor were capsized. Disease and aftershocks followed, which claimed
more lives and deepened the disaster. The enslaved capitalized on this opportunity wherever
possible, fleeing from plantations across the island. In response, the Council of Jamaica issued a
bounty on all “runaway negroes,” at a rate of “£4 a head for every negro brought in alive and £2
a head for every negro brought in dead.”264 By April of 1693 martial law was declared to put the
island in a posture of defense in case any rival European powers seize upon the weakened state
of the colony.
The fears of the Jamaican plantocracy were realized in June 1694 when the French
invaded. Most of the French forces landed at Cow Bay in the southeast of the island in St. David
and ransacked the plantations, plundering any valuables, kidnapping the enslaved, and burning
all structures to the ground. Additional forces landed on the northside of the island and swept
through St. Mary and St. George, while a further contingent landed southwest of the capital in
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Old Harbour. The Council of Jamaica issued orders on June 6 for, “abandoning the forts to
windward, and that all people come in to Liguanea and Kingston with their cattle, negroes, etc,”
to join the forces stationed there to defend the capital and harbor.265 This invasion so soon after
the 1692 earthquake caught the colony at its weakest state since initial conquest. Governor
William Beeston took every precaution to fortify Kingston and St. Jago de la Vega. Every man
on the island was called to arms. The French who invaded at Old Harbour prevented forces from
Vere and Clarendon to rendezvous in the capital where their services were desperately needed.
Beeston wrote to Major Richard Lloyd that, “since the place is so full of conveniences for
ambuscados [sic]…to consider the Cockpitt [sic] path, whether they will not those moonshine
nights give you the slipp [sic] over to Old Harbour and hither.”266 In this moment of desperation,
the colonial forces leaned on hard-learned lessons from their encounters with the guerrilla
warfare of the “rebellious negroes” to out-maneuver the French and stave off the invasion. The
island was not lost to conquest, but well over one thousand enslaved laborers were stolen, an
undetermined number of “free negroes” were also taken, and dozens of plantations were raided
and destroyed.
Agricultural production of the colony ground to a halt with the devastation wrought by
the French. Enslaved Africans continued to be imported in large numbers and in 1694-1695 a
total of 7,152 were disembarked in Jamaica. Much of this served to replenish plantations that had
been stripped of valuables and laborers. Once these estates had been served, importation dropped
dramatically from 1696-1698 with just 3,757 enslaved Africans disembarked during this threeyear period. In October 1698, William Beeston reported to the Council of Trade and Plantation
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that there were approximately 2,465 “white men” on the island as opposed to “Negroes of all
sorts, sexes, and ages, about 40,000.”267 A good portion of these “white men” would have been
merchants, troops, and residents of Kingston or St. Jago de la Vega, meaning that the 16:1 ratio
of “negroes” to “white men” was probably far greater. The colony was in ruins and planters on
the northside were destitute for want of oversight and security. Meanwhile, the Maroons of
Jamaica flourished in isolation yet again.
The English colony of Jamaica in its reduced state after 1694 could not effectively
combat the “rebellious negroes.” Campaigns against these groups in the latter half of the 1690s
were scarce and ineffective. In January 1695, a Captain Hanger reported to the Council of
Jamaica that there had been, “a fight with the rebellious negroes, in which the negroes had shown

[Figure 4.3] Herman Moll, The island of Jamaica, divided into its principal parishes, Scale 1:1,100,000, (London:
Herman Moll, 1728).
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themselves very resolute and had killed one of his men and wounded another, whereupon he
desired to be reinforced.”268 For the next ten years, the Maroons focused their efforts on
agriculture and settlement. Distinct communities formed political relationships and consolidated
with each other through “bitter power struggles that manifested themselves in battles for
leadership among different clans.”269 The Maroons developed robust infrastructures that included
coastal access at Titchfield and Manchioneal Bays where they could obtain fish and turtle as well
as harvest salt from coastal beds for curing and storing meats [Figure 4.3].270 These sites were
used by a variety of communities and fostered communication amongst the distinct groups and
were vital nodes in the broader geographies of Marronage.
The Maroons coalesced into distinct towns in the early eighteenth century, becoming as
mighty as the colonial forces. A powerful community formed out of the ascendancy of Cudjoe
over multiple groups in Western Cockpit Country, one of which was a group of shipwrecked
enslaved Madagascans.271 “Cudjoe Town,” which was later renamed “Trelawny Town,” and
Accompong emerged from this group. Along the northeastern ranges of the Blue Mountains, the
community led by “Cuffee” and later “Quao” formed “Crawford Town,” which was situated on
the banks of the Buff Bay River in the Blue Mountains of St. George [Figure 4.4]. An additional
town was located due east of Crawford Town on the banks of the Rio Grande, which was listed
as “New Negro Town” on the Browne, Sheffield, and Bayly map published in 1755, A New Map
of Jamaica [Figure 4.4].
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[Figure 4.4] Patrick Browne, J. Bayly, and Sheffield, A New Map of Jamaica, Scale 1:250,000, (London, 1755).

Working back from these later maps helps to connect the dots between what is known of
the Maroons in the late seventeenth century and the first two decades of the eighteenth century to
form a more holistic framework of their contingent geographies. Fortifications and military
positions that were established in regions of heightened Maroon activity in the eighteenth
century demonstrate both how the colony responded to Marronage and the landscapes occupied
by those engaged in it. The foundation and mapping of Maroon towns by the colony was a de
facto recognition of the geographies formed by these populations filtered through the lens of
mercantilist expansion. Herman Moll’s map published in 1728 did not include these towns and it
is likely that the colony still possessed little in the way of accurate information about their
locations [Figure 4.3]. The Moll Map also did not depict a barracks built in the immediate
vicinity of Trelawny Town and another nearby Accompong, which were included on “A New
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Map of Jamaica.” Another barrack was constructed in between Port Antonio and “the rebel
haunts” in 1733, which did not make an appearance on either map.272
The layouts of Maroon towns were strategically designed to ensure that any single
engagement with colonial forces would not destroy the community entirely. The principal
settlement of the community was constructed at the highest elevation, making use of the rocky
precipices along the slopes of the Blue Mountains, while smaller settlements at lower elevations
could be easily abandoned and left to be destroyed by the colonial forces at little cost to the
community who would retreat to the main stronghold in the hills.273 Every aspect of Jamaican
Marronage was a carefully considered balance between security and utility: locations were
chosen based on the safety the landscape provided and its proximity to a diversity of natural
resources. Individual settlements that constituted the larger Maroon town apparatus were
established with the knowledge that one could be abandoned and lost without compromising the
whole. For this reason, each individual settlement was planted with provisions in addition to the
large crop fields that were sewn as a means of ensuring that the community could weather
engagements with colonial forces.
The Maroons that settled in the Blue Mountains of northeastern Jamaica saw – and
continue to see – themselves as the autochthons of these landscapes.274 They cultivated and
defended these territories against colonial expansion and in these efforts defined unique
geographies. Settlements within these landscapes were connected by networks of
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communication, subsistence, and resistance that rejected and subverted the authority of the
colony in its entirety. The Maroons posed both a tangible threat to settlers and a symbolic threat
to the stability of colonialism on the island. The enslaved saw what the Maroons had
accomplished and in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries seized on the weakness
of the colony and their own numerical superiority to attain some semblance of this autonomy.
In 1698, the English estimated that Jamaica contained roughly 40,000 enslaved Africans
and needed many more to become profitable. The precarious situation of the colony in the 1690s
forestalled any significant investment, but with those issues resolved, the early eighteenth
century presented great opportunity for aspiring English capitalists. In the 1670s, English
Jamaica disembarked a total of 14,491 enslaved Africans. By the first decade of the eighteenth
century, that figure had skyrocketed to 53,947 individuals and during the 1720s Jamaica saw the
arrival of 75,467 enslaved Africans.275 This massive increase, more than five-fold within the
span of 40 years, tracked with the expansion of plantations and the broadening of commerce to
allow for the entry of private merchants. It also precipitated the inevitable: widespread rebellions
by the enslaved who vastly outnumbered the “whites” and an island wide confrontation between
the ever-expanding colony and Jamaica’s Maroons.
Queen Anne was crowned in London in March 1702, at which point the Royal African
Company was being overtly shunned by the English Crown. The Company monopoly over the
slave trade was undermined by a series of acts that legitimized independent trading. As of 1712,
British slave trading was fully independent, and Jamaica’s planters could acquire enslaved labor
without restriction.276
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It is against this colonial backdrop of the early eighteenth century that the First Maroon
War took shape, with communities growing through the inclusion of new runaways from the
ever-expanding presence of sugar plantations. However, it was in the terse, uncertain period of
colonialism from 1670-1700 that the geographical contours of Maroon resistance were laid
through confrontation and negotiation with the expansion of plantations on the northside of the
island. Jamaica’s Maroons were not passive observers of this growing threat to the landscapes
they called home.
The initial decades of the eighteenth century saw sporadic engagements turn to open and
island-wide warfare. The Maroons used every aspect of their natural environment and their
intimate knowledge of the colony to seize advantages. They formed relationships with enslaved
laborers on nearby plantations, traded with private merchants stopping in ports on the island’s
northside, and purchased goods from Jewish merchants who the colony had forced to live apart
from the other merchants of the colony in “Jew Alley.”277 Each of these individual strategic
decisions were part and parcel of the larger geographic framework of Jamaican Marronage; each
node on that “map” was of immeasurable importance to their survival. The geographic
foundations of Jamaican Marronage are central to the Maroon identity. Reading along the bias
grain of colonial maps unveils how the landscapes deemed uncleared and unsettled by the
plantocracy were not only occupied but cultivated and part of a much larger network of
subsistence. These foundational years of Marronage laid the groundwork for the more protracted
warfare of the 1720s and 1730s and by pairing what we know from later maps we can better
understand the processes by which resistance was honed and refined in the late seventeenth
century.
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4.4

Resistance or Incorporation: Contrasting the Legacies of the Palenques of Juan de
Serras and Juan de Bolas
In the initial five years of the English conquest of Spanish Jamaica, the various palenques

of “rebellious negroes” were presented with a choice: accept the overtures of the invading army
and be welcomed as members of the colonial populace or continue to oppose the English and
face the full force of the colony. In the parallel histories of the palenques led by Juan de Serras
and Juan de Bolas we can observe the fallout of these two divergent paths by tracing them
through the colonial record. Juan de Serras and the “Varmahaly” were obstinate in their refusal
to consider terms offered by the English. Their journey as it relates to English Jamaica began in
the isolated terrain of northern Clarendon, which is featured on Slaney’s map of 1678 as the
“Virimijalas Savana” due west of “Mount Diabolo [sic],” where they first staged their resistance.
Their tenuous and pragmatic relationship with the Spanish insurgency lasted only so far as it
served their own needs. When the Spanish had proven themselves ineffective allies, Juan de
Serras and his community abandoned the former masters of the island, choosing isolation and
Marronage instead. The migration of the “Varmahaly” into the southern, mountainous stretches
of St. Mary and St. George was facilitated by a deft political sleight of hand that used the
desperation of the English to secure their passage unmolested. In this pristine landscape, the
“Varmahaly” took root and became masters of their domain, expanding over time with the
addition of new runaways – despite initial reluctance – and in collaboration with nearby
settlements. Although it is impossible to trace with exactitude what became of the distinct
individuals who constituted the “Varmahaly,” the strategic choices this community made were
distinctive in shaping Marronage island wide.
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The community of Juan de Bolas presents the alternative path: a history following the
acceptance of overtures from the English and an earnest integration into the colony. The
palenque led by Juan de Bolas was integrated into the English colony thereafter 1663 for their
services rendered to the colony from 1660-1663. Members of the community above the age of 18
were granted thirty acres each but there was no definitive process for deciding where these plots
of land would be located. What little is known can only be gleaned from colonial maps, surveys,
and land deeds. Ogilby’s “Novissima et Accuratissima Jamaicae Descriptio,” from 1671, which
was based on surveys conducted the preceding decade, depicts the “Juan de Bola Palink [sic]” as
lying in the far southeastern extent of “St. Annes” in a valley between the “Mount Diabla [sic]”
and the “Porus Mountaines [sic]” [Figure 3.3]. Mount Diablo can be visited today in the
southeastern extents of St. Ann Parish, but no record remains of the location of the “Porus”
Mountains. Bochart and Knollis’s 1684 work shows the location of “Iuan [sic] de Bolas” along
with three provision grounds (or less likely, “cotton workes”) in far western “St. Johns” [Figure
4.2]. Both a mountain and a river in this region were named after Juan de Bolas and remain as
such to the present day, but it is unclear whether members of the palenque settled there after
1663 or if the placenames were merely renamed thereafter. What is clear is that not all the
“Spanish negroes” that served under Juan de Bolas settled in this location.
A survey conducted in 1687 because of a land sale provides insight into the precise
location of at least a portion of this community. John Goffe was employed to survey a parcel of
land in the area known as the “Great Camanas” in St. Katherine’s Parish in 1687 in preparation
for a land sale [Figure 4.5]. The primary sellers for this land patent are listed as William Moseley
and “Antonio Mosso do Campo, Francisco Angola Mosso do Campo, and Captain Primo and the
rest of the Company of Spanish Negroes of Great Camanos” and the sole purchaser is one
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Captain John Ellis.278 This land patent also mentions “Manuel Chiquito” along with Antonio
Mosso do Campo in reference to an additional parcel included in the sale that was not contiguous
with the rest of the land held by the “Spanish Negroes.” According to this patent, the “Spanish
Negroes” sold 26 acres of the 164 acres they possessed, which this document states had been
deeded to them in 1667.279 In August 1670, Edward Stanton wrote to Colonel Thomas Lynch,
then Lieutenant-Governor, that English prisoners who had been rescued reported that, “42
Spanish negroes from Jamaica have got safe to Cuba.”280 In 1671, Governor Thomas Lynch
wrote to the Crown about having “expelled a parcel of Spanish Negroes and mulattos which did
much mischief,” but there is no other identifying information for the group.281 The collection of
42 “Spanish negroes” that fled to Cuba did so in secret so as not to draw the attention of the
colony, but where their allegiance had lain prior to doing so is unclear.
Meanwhile, the Varmahaly made sporadic attacks on settlers on the northern end of the
island throughout the 1670s that became exceedingly regular. An entry on January 23, 1676 is
perhaps the last specific mention of the “Spanish negroes” in the English record until the details
of the 1687 land patent, “Six Spanish negroes to be sent over to assist with their lances” in “St
Maryes [sic]” where the English were attempting to combat the “rebellious negroes” who were

The patent refers to both “Great Camanas” and “Great Camanos” but the area being described is undoubtedly
what is known today as “Caymanas.”
279
“A Gate formerly belonging to the Spanish Negroes,” Survey for Captain John Ellis, January 8, 1687, St.
Catherine Platts, 2, f. 122, 1B/11/2/7, Jamaica Archives and Record Department. The patent states, “being part of
164 acres of land granted unto Antonio Mosso do Campo, Francisco Angola Mosso do Campo, and Capt. Primo and
the rest of the Company of Spanish Negroes of Great Camanas by patent bearing date the 6 day of May in the
nineteenth year of his late majesties reign.” The Council of Jamaica declared on February 1st of 1663 that land
would be deeded to “Juan Luyola and the rest of the negroes of his Palenque.” Mavis C. Campbell states in The
Maroons of Jamaica, 1655-1796 that two “Spanish negroes” named Paul and Domingo were accredited as
diplomatic representatives of the colony in 1667, but no additional information is provided as to any direct
compensation for these services. A survey and census ordered by Governor Modyford in 1670 did not include the
“Spanish negroes.”
280
“Aug. 25, Edward Stanton to Col. Thos. Lynch, America and West Indies: August 1670,” in CSPCAWI: Volume
7, 1669-1674.
281
“Dec. 21, The Governor of Jamaica's, [Sir Thos. Lynch] answers to the inquiries of his Majesty's Commissioners,
America and West Indies: December 1671, 16-31 in CSPCAWI: Volume 7, 1669-1674.
278

131
harassing settlers.282 It is difficult to distinguish who exactly was grouped into the “Spanish
negroes” because the English record only named individuals in rare circumstances like in the
case of the two men assigned to treat with Juan de Serras in 1668.283 Given what is known about
the outlying Maroons and their unwillingness to accept English offers of land, liberty, and – after
years of ambushes and raids – pardons, it is not unreasonable to conclude that these “Spanish
negroes” had been part of the palenque of Juan de Bolas and that there was a dissolution of the
community after integration into the English system.
The land patent of 1687 stated that the “Spanish negroes” sold their land to John Ellis in
1681 [Figure 4.5]. This suggests a disintegration of landholdings by those who relocated to plots
deeded by the English. By parceling and selling off their land, the physical and legal presence of
the “Spanish negroes” was being consumed by the adjacent estates of wealthier, connected
English landowners. This process was occurring across Jamaica at the end of the seventeenth and
into the eighteenth century and, by 1740, the larger sugar plantations and animal pens had,
“swallowed up by degrees all the little settlements around.”284 The specific reasons why
“Antonio Mosso do Campo, Francisco Angola Mosso do Campo, and Captain Primo,” along
with, “the rest of the Company of Spanish Negroes of Great Camanos,” sold these lands are
unknown. Combining what is known about this community with the political and economic
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[Figure 4.5] “A Gate formerly belonging to the Spanish Negroes,” Survey for Captain John
Ellis, January 8, 1687, St. Catherine Platts, 2, f. 122, 1B/11/2/7, Jamaica Archives and Record
Department.
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conditions of this period of English colonialism isolates some distinct possibilities. One potential
reason for the sale is the economic pressure inherent with land ownership in the English system.
Even before the fields could be sewn, the “Spanish negroes” would have needed substantial
capital with which to pay for clearing the land even before the standard quitrents on the land
owned needed to be paid.285 This group then would have needed to sow and harvest a quantity of
cash crops for sale capable of generating the kind of profit necessary to continue this yearly
process and to maintain many dozens of acres.
The Spanish Jamaican colony, such that it was, did not invest in exploiting the island
agriculturally. At least a portion of the palenque of Juan de Bolas were free men who grew crops
and may have purchased products under the aegis of Spanish colonialism. They were almost
assuredly not integrated into markets that extended beyond the immediate confines of St. Jago de
la Vega knowing that even the vecinos of the island lacked such access. They planted crops for
subsistence and produced goods on a very small scale. Any crops grown in Spanish Jamaica for
export were luxuries typically produced on the haciendas of semi-feudal oligarchs and consumed
in Spain. The 200 acres of crops discovered by the English that were planted by the palenque of
Juan de Bolas in 1660 was an impressive feat by any measure amidst the hostilities of English
conquest and Spanish resistance. However, these fields were likely planted with cassava, crops
like rice and herbs brought from Africa, or fruit native to Jamaica that had no demand beyond the
island in the late seventeenth century and that English colonists and settlers were reticent to eat
as well.
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The ecological practices honed and refined by the “Spanish negroes” were the envy of the
English in the late 1650s. The palenque of Juan de Bolas made effective use of the natural
landscape despite constant warfare between the English and Spanish. Post-conquest, this form of
agriculture was largely incompatible with a burgeoning mercantilist economic system that
prioritized cash crops that could be sold in London for profit. These crops necessitated large, upfront capital investment and a substantial plot of cleared land for planting to hope to achieve
levels of production that could net profits. Even in the earliest years of English Jamaica when
agriculture was more diversified and settlers were transported to the island and granted land at no
cost, the overhead for establishing profit generating plantation operations could be immense.
There were costs for surveying land, clearing the land granted after survey, and for the labor and
seed needed for planting the land. Each of these costs were in addition to the annual quitrent,
which alone was onerous enough that even large, wealthy landholders like the Earl of Carbery,
former Governor John Vaughan, fell into such untenable debts that they were forced to
relinquished vast swaths of land in 1709.286
The 1687 land patent provides some insight into the internal dynamics of the colony at
that time. The land held by the “Spanish negroes” borders a road that separates their holdings
from several nearby English plantations. The land survey included depicts a gate on this road,
“formerly belonging to the Spanish Negroes,” that restricted access.287 This suggests, at the very
least, that the inhabitants had been wary of outsiders and sought some sense of autonomy in
isolation. The gate itself remained, while possession of it was relinquished by 1687. With so little
supporting information, it is impossible to be certain of the fate of the “Spanish Negroes of Great
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Camanos,” but each of these details in addition to the land sale indicates that settlement had not
engendered long-term stability of the community. At least some of the inhabitants remained
beyond 1687, but these properties were never featured on colonial maps.
The purchaser of the parcels of land formerly held by the “Spanish Negroes” in 1681,
John Ellis, was a major character in the history of English colonialism of Jamaica. He rose to the
rank of Major in the colonial forces and in the 1680s and 1690s he served as an Assemblyman
for St. Mary’s and St. Katherine’s Parish. In May 1685, he was called upon by the Council of
Jamaica to suppress, “the negroes’ market at the River’s mouth” and to arrest any, “who sell rum
to the negroes.”288 The descendants of John Ellis continued expanding their landholdings
throughout the eighteenth century and additional members of the family held offices in the
colonial government. The land purchased from the “Spanish Negroes of the Great Camanos”
became part of a large, productive trio sugar plantation known as the “Caymanas,” where
sugarcane was grown and processed until 1968.289 Today, the land still bears the name Caymanas
and is home to a golf course and country club.
The names of the “Spanish Negroes of Great Camanos” included as sellers on the 1687
land patent reveal some details about the community. In particular, the individuals “Antonio
Mosso do Campo, Francisco Angola Mosso do Campo, and Captain Primo,” point to a hierarchy
within the group. Working off the assumption that “Mosso do Campo” is derived from “Maestro
de Campo,” which was akin to the chief of staff to the executive authority of the “Capitán,” it is
likely that these individuals were the leaders of the community. The “Spanish Negroes of Great
Camanos” may have been the “Spanish Negroes” called upon in 1676, “to assist with their
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lances,” if naming conventions were reflective of the internal dynamics of the community. The
name “Francisco Angola Mosso do Campo” speaks to the regional origin of enslaved Africans in
Spanish Jamaica, which diverged from English Jamaica and the diversity of the enslaved
population imported in the seventeenth century.
Francisco Angola Mosso do Campo likely originated in the former Kingdom of Ndongo,
which was colonized by the Portuguese as Angola and whose inhabitants were captured and sold
into slavery by Imbangala raiders throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.290 The enslaved individuals from this region of Africa who were transported to
Jamaica were the victims or descendants of victims of warfare between the Portuguese
colonizers, the Kingdom of Ndongo, and the Kingdom of Kongo. Their lives would have been
dictated by quarrels between rival powers long before their enslavement and might help to
explain the decision of the palenque of Juan de Bolas to form an alliance with the English to
preserve their community. In the face of imperial conquest, the “Spanish Negroes” chose
guarantees of land ownership and autonomy over destruction and re-enslavement.
However, it seems clear from the land patent that despite their integration into the
colonial armed forces and legal ownership of the land deeded for their services, the community
kept the English at arm’s length and were not entirely assimilated into colonial society. The
“Spanish Negroes of the Great Camanos” never appeared on colonial maps of Jamaica. Their
properties lay roughly five miles inland from Passage Fort on the coast of Port Royal Harbor, the
site of so much devastation in the 1690s. After the devastating earthquake of 1692, the remainder
of the decade featured regular hurricane activity followed by outbreaks of disease. The invasion
in 1694 was but one of many instances in which the French predated on the colony and in
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February 1698 an inquest was unsuccessfully made to ascertain how many “free negroes the
French may have carried off from Jamaica.”291 It is entirely possible that the “Spanish Negroes
of the Great Camanos” fell victim to any number of these forces or the mounting economic
pressures they faced. The English colony was in a state of rapid depopulation as the century
ended and the “Spanish Negroes,” despite maintaining some semblance of physical isolation
from the colonists, could not have been immune to these pressures.
The histories of the palenques led by Juan de Bolas and Juan de Serras survive in the
margins of the colonial archives as examples of divergent approaches to managing the threat of
the English conquest of Jamaica. Integration into the colonial forces and deeds of land granted
the community of Juan de Bolas did not insulate them from the internal and external pressures
confronted by any settler of early English Jamaica and especially those of the 1690s. The
strategic approach of Juan de Serras and his people, namely isolation, subsistence, and
resistance, may have appeared the riskier bet at the signing of the Treaty of Madrid in 1670, but
by the 1690s was undoubtedly the preferable path. The dissolution of landholdings and eventual
disappearance of the “Spanish Negroes” from the English record could have come as the result
of any number of factors: economic burdens, natural disasters, disease, and warfare all played
some role in the fate of this community. It is also possible, but less likely, that individuals
secured passage, or attempted passage themselves, to Cuba. Whatever the case, by the turn of the
eighteenth century the trajectories of the former palenques of de Bolas and de Serras were
entirely dissimilar. The far less secure life in Marronage in the mountainous interior of the
northside of Jamaica had proven to be the enduring choice. In their complete opposition to the
English colony, the “Varmahaly” led by Juan de Serras fought for unequivocal autonomy and
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sovereignty over the territories that composed the geographies of Marronage long before the
signing of any treaties. Revisiting the words of Chief Michael Grizzle of the Trelawny TownFlagstaff Maroons, “The ancestors did not simply reject colonial rule and enslavement, they
opposed Western civilization in its entirety.”
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5

EPILOGUE

In 1728, the Jamaican colonial government and newly appointed Governor Robert Hunter
adopted a far more aggressive posture to fight what can most closely be described as a protracted
guerrilla war against the Maroons. The full might of the colonial forces, buoyed by troops sent
by the British Empire that same year and backed by the emergent economic power of the
Jamaican plantocracy, were committed to the task of extricating the Maroons from their
landscapes. Shortly before this period of open warfare, the Treaty of Union had been signed
between Scotland and England, which began the process of transforming the English overseas
possessions into an ideologically coherent British Empire.292 This period also signaled a change
in the war strategies of the colonial Jamaican forces against the Maroons. In June 1720,
Governor Nicholas Lawes entered into an agreement with the head of the Miskito people of
Honduras to bring some of the Miskito to Jamaica to hunt the Maroons. These campaigns were
not effective in their immediate goals of defeating the Maroons, but the Miskito provided
insights to the Jamaican colonial forces about guerrilla tactics, including maintaining silence on
marches to not divulge their position on approach.293 In 1728, Governor Hunter began to
aggressively pursue settlement of Port Antonio with the explicit intent to, “add to the strength
and security of that part of the Island not only against a foreign enemy but also against the
rebellious negroes.”294 The British colony of Jamaica had assumed a posture of war toward the
Maroons.
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The sharp increase in operations and the changing nature of these operations against the
distinct Maroon communities that had coalesced by the turn of the eighteenth century coincided
with land reforms enacted by the colonial government. Large plantations consumed smaller
landholdings in Jamaica and dominated the colonial landscape. These massive properties
produced an unintended consequence: by squeezing small landholders out of the colony, they left
large tracts of land uncleared and unsettled. As a result, until the land reforms of the 1720s and
1730s, the Maroons remained insulated from colonial settlement.295 To compound the issue of
the preponderance of latifundias – large, private estates worked by the enslaved – that dominated
Jamaican agriculture and land ownership, many of these properties were owned by second and
third generation “absentee owners” who oversaw their vast estates from the comforts of England.
As plantation owners, they applied a form of capitalism that fused the patriarchalism of the
English aristocracy with the violent, dehumanizing exploitation of transatlantic slavery.296 These
absentee owners relied on the management structure of the extended household of a bygone era,
which created hierarchies within plantation operations that often led to factionalism in the
structures of oversight.297 Absentee owners also demonstrated a tendency to second-guess their
subordinates managing the properties and enslaved labor force, which forestalled necessary
improvements and investment. This relationship between the absentee owner and the operations
of their Jamaican plantation further immiserated the lives of the enslaved, placing more onerous
demands on their labor and leaving them without food, clothing, and medical care while
enforcing more violence in their daily lives.298 These conditions – a lack of oversight and
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investment and a deepening of the misery of enslavement – invariably led to an increase in the
number of revolts in the early eighteenth century.
By this period, Maroon communities had softened their position on bozales and their
populations grew, inflecting Jamaican Marronage with the ongoing, transatlantic fight against
enslavement that Vincent Brown defines as, “the Coromantee War…the outcome of black
military intellect in Jamaica.”299 While the colony grappled with absenteeism and the latifundias,
the Jamaican Maroons formed discrete, independent political units that collaborated and
communicated with one another. In the process, these relationships broadened and connected
Maroon geographies, interlinking communities through networks of subsistence and cultural
practice that stretched from the territories of western Cockpit Country that became Accompong
Town to Nanny Town and Crawford Town in the eastern extents of the Blue Mountains. These
geographic configurations did not rely on possession and settlement in the explicit sense defined
by English colonialism and mercantilism. Sovereignty in these territories was determined by
elements of West African land tenure practices that did not vest ownership in the individual but
were instead predicated on first comer claims and natural resource access – especially hunting –
rights of the community. The Maroons did not believe that land possession was determined by
surveys and land grants commissioned by the colony both in theory and in practice: they rejected
the authority of the colony entirely.
It is for this very reason that any periodization of the Maroon Wars as having taken place
from 1728-1739 is anachronistic with the experiences of the Maroons or the enslaved who
revolted and joined their ranks. Their repudiation of English colonialism began with the initial
invasion of St. Jago de la Vega in 1655 and their struggle is intimately rooted in the foundations
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of indigenous and African resistance to Spanish colonialism prior. Geographies and methods of
resistance transformed and evolved over time in response to the expansion of settlement and the
aggression of the colonial forces, but the core opposition never wavered.
The Maroon Wars were not a divergence from the dynamics that had arisen between the
colony and the Maroons, they were a heightening of tensions by the colony to an untenable state.
The colonial forces sought to end Marronage in Jamaica permanently, while the Maroons
hunkered down within their territories to defend the geographies they had articulated over the
preceding half century. The eventual signing of the Maroon Treaty of 1738-39 was a diplomatic
resolution to the tensions between these two distinct societies in Jamaica: that of the Maroons
and the colony. The terms were the result of protracted negotiations between representatives of
both sides and officially recognized the territoriality of Maroon “towns” and their sovereignty
within Cockpit Country. For the colony, the treaty accomplished what so many governors and
planters before had failed to do: pacifying the Maroons to make settlement on the northside of
the island more attractive. The signing of the Treaty for the Maroons signaled a change of course
that was no doubt informed by the violent warfare enacted by the Jamaican colonial government
in preceding decades. Their rejection of the authority of the colony was set aside and the
Maroons sought – in processes defined by British legal tradition – to enshrine the geographies
they had established and defended over the course of the preceding half century. Predictably,
even after the Maroon Treaty became law in British Jamaica, the sovereign territory of Cockpit
Country has never been safe from predations by the colony and the independent Jamaican
government that succeeded it in August 1962. Maroon communities continue to resist the
capitalistic exploitation of their lands, most recently by private mining interests granted leases by
the government.
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The examples laid out by the palenques of Juan de Bolas and Juan de Serras in the
immediate wake of the English invasion in 1655 were each other’s antithesis: alliance and
resistance. However, the signing of the Maroon Treaty reconnected these divergent tangents; The
colonial government recognized Maroon territorial sovereignty, but at the cost of compulsory
service to the colony in times of war against both internal and external enemies. This meant that
Maroons had to fight to quell enslaved uprisings if called upon. Recognition of Maroon
sovereignty did not put an end to all fighting between Maroons and the colonial forces, and in the
late eighteenth century, disputes over the geographic boundaries of Trelawny Town ended with
the capture and deportation of the community to Nova Scotia in May 1796. There they could not
pose a threat to the dominant economic force of the Jamaican plantocracy. If the sovereignty of
the Trelawny Town Maroons could be so quickly and easily violated, then of what value were
the guarantees of the Jamaican colonial government on behalf of the British Empire?
The Maroon Treaty is a pivotal document in Maroon history. It represents the
legitimation of their territorial sovereignty and a recognition of their autonomy. But the articles
of the Treaty provided little security to the Maroons against the unrelenting expansion and
exploitation of the colonial Jamaican plantation system. The capitalist logics that informed these
efforts at plantation were predicated on the efficient and totalizing hyperexploitation of the
Jamaican natural landscape and enslaved African labor to amass profits. These profits enriched
the Jamaican plantocracy and the British Empire, which undermined Maroon legal appeals that
challenged the recognized extents of Cockpit Country. Jamaican colonists attempted to resolve
these questions permanently with the deportation of the Trelawny Town Maroons, but
Accompong Town, Moore Town, Charles Town, and Scott’s Hall persist. Fundamental questions
regarding the territoriality of lands outlined in the Maroon Treaty are still debated today.
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Jamaica was granted independence by the United Kingdom on August 6, 1962. The
independent Jamaican state thereafter adopted the role of ultimate legal authority on the island
and therefore guarantor of the Maroon Treaty. Since independence, the Jamaican government has
grappled with methods for achieving economic self-sufficiency and to avoid the many structures
of international finance that have dictated development in newly independent countries. Bauxite
mining – a mineral important in the production of aluminum – was first highlighted as an
untapped natural resource in the early 1940s by North American mining corporations and postindependence offered a potential means to achieve fiscal stability. As it turns out, the richest
reserves of bauxite on the island lay in Cockpit Country. For two decades, the Maroons and
domestic and international legal organizations focused on indigenous land rights have defended
Maroon sovereignty over the region. These debates are a continuation of the struggle that began
in the late seventeenth century when Maroons forcefully defended their settlements and
contingent geographies in the face of an expanding colony. Recent challenges of Maroon
sovereignty by Jamaican Minister of National Security Horace Chang have resurfaced historical
contentions at the heart of the Maroon Treaty. While the Jamaican government works to redefine
the relationship between the Maroons and the independent state to facilitate capitalist
exploitation of bauxite reserves, the Maroons continue to overtly resist any attempts to
undermine their sovereignty.
On April 8, 2022, the Paramount Queen of the Maroons, Gaama Gloria “Mama G”
Simms issued a formal apology on behalf of the Jamaican Maroons to the people of Jamaica for
the historical role they played in combating enslaved rebellions. In her speech during a
recognition of Tacky’s Revolt, the Paramount Queen declared, “We regret the hurt and

145
sufferings caused from such actions. We take total responsibility on behalf of our ancestors.”300
This apology – and the legitimacy of Mama G – was later challenged by Accompong Colonel
Richard Currie, “The reality is that we are not against apologies or reconciliation, but we are
against acts of representation for people who do not know her as a leader.” Mama G was named
Paramount Chief by the Suriname Maroons and installed at the 2014 Charles Town International
Maroon Conference but was never formally recognized by the leadership of Accompong Town.
In questioning her authority, Colonel Currie highlighted divisions and the diversity of opinions
within the Maroon communities of Jamaica today and the lack of a unifying political ideology.
Maroons occupy a unique place within present-day Jamaica, forced to strike a delicate balance
between forcefully defending their lands and reconciling the historical role played by their
ancestors. The unrelenting advance of capitalism has heightened these tensions and sewn
divisions amongst the Maroons.
Remnants of the land deeded to the “Spanish Negroes of the Great Camanos” in the
1660s by the English colony can be found today nearby Spanish Town. A twenty-minute drive
east on the A1 highway from Spanish Town brings you to Highway 2000 and the “T3 Caymanas
Park Toll.” The lands along this highway were previously held by the “Spanish Negroes” and
sold to John Ellis, which became part of a trio of sugar plantations in the immediate vicinity that

Nyamekye Daniel, “‘On Behalf of Our Ancestors’: Jamaica Maroon Leader Apologizes for Ancestors Helping
Britain Quell Uprisings After the Group Won Their Own Freedom; Gets Mixed Reaction from Community,” Atlanta
Black Star, April 25, 2022, https://atlantablackstar.com/2022/04/25/on-behalf-of-our-ancestors-jamaica-maroonleader-apologizes-for-ancestors-helping-britain-quell-uprisings-after-the-group-won-their-own-freedom-gets-mixedreaction-from-community/.
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[Figure 5.1] Stephen McLaren, photographer, “Caymanas Sugar Plantation,” photograph, (University of St.
Andrews, 2015), From University of St. Andrews Special Collections: Scottish Contemporary and Social
Documentary Collections, SML-1-38.

operated into the nineteenth century. Today, Caymanas Park is the site of Jamaica’s only horse
racing track and a golf course and country club and little remains of the sugar plantation or
community that once held claim to the land. As the Maroons of Cockpit Country continue to
defend their sovereignty, the example of the “Spanish Negroes of the Great Camanos” is a stark
reminder of the economic pressures inherent in the process of integrating into capitalism.
Guarantees of land and liberty for the members of the palenque of Juan de Bolas could not
forestall the effects of a system predicated on the hyperexploitation of the natural environment
and labor. The Jamaican Maroons of the present day face the daunting challenge of balancing
their resistance to the onslaught of global capitalism through the independent Jamaican state with

147
the long-term economic welfare of their communities. Maroons are once again confronted with
the decision between opposition or integration.
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